Toward an American Moral Rights
in Copyright by Lee, Ilhyung
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 58 | Issue 3 Article 3
Summer 6-1-2001
Toward an American Moral Rights in Copyright
Ilhyung Lee
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Rights in Copyright, 58 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 795 (2001),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol58/iss3/3




I. Introduction ....................................... 795
II. Moral Rights and the American Analogue ................ 800
A. Moral Rights International ........................ 800
B. American Judicial Response to DroitMoral ........... 805
C. American Skepticism and Suspicion ................. 811
D. Summary: U.S. Moral Rights ...................... 820
El. Toward Dignity-Based Moral Rights .................... 822
A. What Dignity? .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822
B. American Dignity ............................... 828
C. Dignity-Based Right of Integrity .................... 837
D. Dignity-Based Right in Application .................. 847
IV. Conclusion ..................... * ................. 854
Introduction
Indiana University's newly adopted code of conduct for all participants
in its athletic programs includes the requirement that all players, coaches,
faculty, and staff "treat one another and all other people with dignity and re-
spect."1 Widely seen as a response to the actions of its former basketball
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say Cohen, Brian Hey, and Lom Honey provided able research assistance. Thanks also to the
administration and faculty at Pepperdine Law School for the opportunity to present many of the
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1. INDIANAUNVErrY, OFCEOFCOMMUCAIOONSANDiARKENG,STATEMENTOF
PRwNaP oN THE CoNDucT OF PARTiCIpANTSINSTUDENTATHLEIC PRoAm5 2.1, 3.1,
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coach,' the university's new policy became the latest example of an institu-
tional recognition and demand for personal dignity. The university's action
follows the course of private organizations,3 various states,4 Congress,5 exec-
utive agencies,6 individual nation states,' and the collective member nations
of the United Nations' that refer formally to some sense of individual dignity
in their governing pronouncements.9 Interestingly, none of the propounded
materials with explicit references to "dignity" offer any guidance as to what
the term means, and only the Indiana code of conduct provides for sanctions
in response to actions that violate the requirement of treatment with dignity. 1°
available at httpJwww.indiana.edu/-athlweb/graphic/conducthtml (last visited Oct 1, 2001)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter STATEMENT OF PINCILES]; see also id. 3.1.4 (stating that
"[the obligation of coaches to treat others with dignity and respect .. shall apply to their
treatment of... other coaches, faculty, staff, and administrators; the athletes and personnel of
other teams; officials and referees; members of the news media; and the public"); 3.4.2
(requiring that "[w]hen speaking to the news media and in other public statements and settings,
oaches ... shall conduct themselves with respect and dignity").
2. After the public revelation of the alleged choking of a former player by Coach Robert
M. Knight, university president Myles Brand appointed a commission "to develop fin, clear
guidelines that spell out what is acceptable for coaches, student-athletes, and Athletics Depart-
ment personnel." INDIANA UNIVERSITY, OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS AND MARKETING, 1U
CODE OF CONDUCT COMMISSION PRESENTS RECOMMENDATONS FOR ATHLETICS CODE OF
CONDUCT TO IU PREsIDENT AND TRUSTEES, Sept. 15, 2000 (copy on file with author). At the
conclusion of a four-month study, the commission recommended to the Trustees of Indiana
University guidelines governing conduct for all participants in its athletic programs. The
trustees unanimously approved the code of conduct Minutes of the Trustees of Indiana
University, Indiana University Southeast, Sept 15, 2000, available at http'/Avww.indiana.edu/
-trustees/m000915.html. How and whether the guidelines might have applied to Coach Knight
became moot when his employment with the university was terminated a week before the
commission made its recommendations. For a press account, see IUAthletics Gets a Code of
Conduct: New Rules Put in Place in Wake of KnightDeparture, CHL TRIB., Sept 16, 2000, at
9, available at 2000 WL 3709574.
3. See infra note 192 (stating formal demands for "dignity" by private organizations).
4. See infra notes 200, 206-07 (providing references to "dignity" in state statutes and
constitutions).
5. See infia notes 193-98, 203 (describing use of "dignity" in United States Code).
6. See infra note 199 (referring to"dignity" provisions in CFR regulations).
7. See infra note 184 (providing for right of dignity in national constitutions).
8. See infra notes 146, 148-150, 152 (referring to definition of "dignity" in UN. docu-
ments).
9. Interestingly, Indiana University's code of conduct appears to be among the few
provisions containing the dignity reference that require enumerated persons to treat others with
dignity. STATEMENT OF PMNCIPLES, supra note 1, 2.1, 3.1. The other materials state gener-
ally that certain persons are entitled to dignity.
10. Under the Indiana policy, sanctions for minor violations include warning, increased
monitoring, probation, and University or community service. Id. 5.1.8. Sanctions for "re-
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Yet despite the lack of a consensus on the meaning of the term, and the view
expressed by some that the term is so amorphous that it escapes a precise
definition,"' dignity offers simplicity, a presumed understanding, and universal
appeal. 2 Although American courts have yet to announce a judicial recogni-
tion of a dignity right," the many references to individual dignity in both state
and federal law,14 as well as the demand for it by private groups, suggest a
nascent dignity movement afoot in American law and policy.
Dignity may also have a part in American copyright and the law govern-
ing the works of authors, 5 an idea that has been alluded to cursorily by
commentators,' 6 and the elaboration of which this Article provides explicitly.
peated or deliberate noncompliance" include suspension or expulsion from the University,
termination of employment, and referral for criminal prosecution. Id. 5.1.9.
11. See infra note 154 (noting that definition of dignity lacks consensus).
12. That is, few could be opposed to the requirement of treating persons with dignity.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 188-90.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 193-213.
15. Following the practice of several commentators, the term "author" herein refers not
only to authors of written text, but to a broad category of creators of various forms of art. E.g.,
Phyllis Amarnick, American Recognition of the Moral Right: Issues and Options, 29 COPY-
.IGFiT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 31, 32 n.5 (1983) ("1 use the terms artist, author, and creator inter-
changeably, except when a particular art form is being discussed."); Thomas F. Cotter, Prag-
matism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1, 4 n.12 (1997) ("I shall use the
terms 'author,' 'artist,' and 'creator' interchangeably to refer to any person who creates a liter-
ary work, musical composition, motion picture or other 'work of authorship' as that term is
defined under the Copyright Act" (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994))); Arthur S. Katz, The
Doctrine ofMoral Right andAmerican Copyright Law -A Proposal, 24 S. CAL. L. REV. 375,
375 n.2 (1951) ("TIhe term 'author' is intended to refer to creators of all forms of art.... ").
16. SeeH.R.REP.No. 101-514, at 15 (1990),reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 6915,6925
(quoting following statement of John B. Koegel, Esq.: "It is a rebuke to the dignity of the visual
artist that our copyright law allows distortion, modification and even outright permanent
destruction of such efforts."); 3 MELVILUE B. NIMER & DAVID NIMMER, NMMER ON COPY-
RIG=T § 8D.02[D][4], at 8D-26 n.106 (1999) ("The issue of moral rights implicates fumdamental
concerns about human dignity."); Ariel L. Bendor, Prior RestrainA Incommensurability, and
the Constitutionalism ofMeans, 68 FORDHAML. REV. 289, 324 n.197 (1999) ("A moral right,
in the context of intellectual property, is the right of a creator to control his creation so that it
will not be changed or distorted in a way that may injure his dignity." (citing Susan P. Liemer,
UnderstandingArtists'MoralRights A Primer, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 41,44 (1998))); see also
Edward J. Damich, The VisualArtists RightsAct of 1990: Toward a Federal System ofMoral
RightsProtection for VisualArt, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 945,997 (1990) [hereinafter Damich, The
VisualArtists Rights Act of 1990] ("Moral rights are akin to the dignitary torts...."); Robert
G. Howell, Publicity Rights in the Common Law Provinces of Canada, 18 LoY. LA. ENT. L.J.
487, 505-06 (1998) (noting that under Canadian law, "moral rights... by their nature present
elements that can be compared with rights in defamation being partially directed to the dignity
of an author"); Neil Netanel,Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement ofAuthorAuton-
omy in United'States and Continental CopyrightLaw, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1,13,14
(1994) (noting Continental law's assimilation of copyright within, among others, "personality
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Traditionally, the focus of American copyright law has been on the distribu-
tion and allocation ofthe pecuniary or property rights that flow from a created
work.'7 Such a scheme would likely have little room for consideration of the
individual dignity of the creator. In more recent years, American law has
moved away from a solely proprietary approach to copyright and toward a sys-
tem that provides for some recognition of an author's personal rights in her
creations, even after the full panoply of proprietary interests transfers into
another's hands. This latter approach leaves open the possibility that the
author's dignity can and should be considered and respected. In 1990, Con-
gress enacted the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), which provides certain
artists the rights of attribution (the right to have the artist's name attributed to
her work) and the right of integrity (the right to protection from certain muti-
lation, deformation, or distortion of the work). II Though far removed from the
comprehensive protections given to authors in civil law jurisdictions, 9 the
federal statute, along with similar state statutes and selected case law, places
the United States in the ranks of those jurisdictions that recognize, at least to
some limited degree, the author's moral rights. This branch of copyright law
has been much discussed" and continues to be controversial. Advocates of
moral rights point to the very limited number of authors entitled to protection
under VARA and the sporadic case law that applies to situations not covered
by the statute, and complain that moral rights protections under American law
are inadequate. Notably, what emerges from the commentary, from both those
who advocate more elaborate moral rights and those who are skeptical that
such rights could co-exist with already established law and practice, is the
need for a construct, a rationale or a basis, for a moral rights system that is
more adaptable to the established American socio-legal culture and copyright
rights (rights of reputation, privacy, and other personal dignity interests)"); Dan Rosen &
Chikako Usui, The Social Structure of Japanese Intellectual Property Law, 13 UCLA PAC.
BASiN L.J. 32,34 n.8 (1994) (citing Dan Rosen, Artists'MoralRights: A European Evolution,
an American Revolution, 2 CARDOZO ARTS &ENT. L.J. 155 (1983)) (noting that under French
law, intellectual property rights serve "not as an incentive but rather as a recognition of the
creator's dignity"); Vera Zlatarski, '?voral"Rights and Other Moral Interests: PublicArt Law
in France, Russia, and the United States, 23 CoL2UM. - VLAJ.L. & ARTS 201,213-14 (1999)
(noting that under Russian law, moral rights include right "to protect the work from any distor-
tion that might injure the honor and dignity of the author").
17. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and theMoralRight: Is an American Marriage
Possible?, 38 VAND. L. Rrv. 1, 2 (1985) [hereinafter Kwal, Copyright and the Moral'Right];
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: A Property and
Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.L 47, 59 (1994) [hereinafter Kwall, The Right of Publicily].
18. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (1994). The rights of attribution and integrity are discussed in
more detail at infra text accompanying notes 34-39.
19. A discussion of the French droitmoral follows at infra text accompanying notes 43-52.
20. For a recommended partial bibliography, see infra note 25.
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history.2 It is precisely this situation in which the moral rights system based
on the dignity of the author could help to fill a void.
Simply, this Article invites consideration of authorial dignity as a basis
for the development of an American moral rights doctrine. More likely to
occur through legislative initiative rather than judge-made rule, the proposed
plan would recognize the dignity of the author, which would require respect
for the author's role as a creator and for the created product as a reflection of
the author's personality.' The dignity-based right of integrity, which is at
heart of the moral rights doctrine, would then extend procedural devices of
prior notice of another's alteration or use of the author's work and the au-
thor's opportunity to object, and the principal substantive right to challenge
such alteration or use. The proposed approach contemplates a balancing of
the author's right of integrity with the interests of the party seeking uncon-
sented alteration or use. This approach to moral rights would likely lead to
more substantial protections than those currently available under U.S. law, but
still short of that seen in civil law countries. Importantly, enhanced moral
rights protections would be effected not bytransplanting the system of another
jurisdiction's rule or "slavish copying"24 thereof, but by an American system
of moral rights that is based on an American sense of dignity.
The discussion herein is divided into two main parts. Part II provides a
brief background of moral rights in the international setting, and the develop-
ment of moral rights stateside (especially the right of integrity). This Part
capitalizes on the considerable bibliography on the subject,' and where
21. See infra text accompanying notes 106-15,137. One court aptly phrased the question
thus: "[T]here arises the question of the norm by which the use of such work is to be tested to
determine whether or not the author's moral right as an author has been violated. Is the
standard to be good taste, artistic worth, political beliefs, moral concepts or what is it to be?"
Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 80 N.Y.S.2d 575, 579 (N.Y. Spec. Term
1948), afrd, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (N.Y. App. Div. 1949).
22. The case for an American right of personality toward moral rights protection is made
most directly in Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the
Protection of the Moral Rights ofAuthors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1 (1988) [hereinafter Damich, The
Right of Personality]. The personality interest in moral rights is further discussed and ques-
tioned in Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest ofArtists and Inventors in Intellectual Prop-
erly, 16 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. LJ. 81 (1998) [hereinafter Hughes, The Personality Interest
ofArtists and Inventors], and Justin Hughes, The Philosophy ofintellectual Property, 77 GEo.
LJ. 287, 350-54 (1988) [hereinafter Hughes, The Philosophy ofIntellectualProperty].
23. See infra note 38 (noting commentators' view that right ofintegrity is central to moral
rights doctrine).
24. Damich, The Right ofPersonality, supra note 22, at 5.
25. Although an exhaustive bibliography of moral rights is not offered herein, there are
highly recommended works toward an informed study of the subject. An early piece, and a
capable introduction of the subject, is Martin A. Roeder, The Doctine ofMoralRight: A Study
in the Law ofArists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554 (1940). Additional helpful
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appropriate, includes a critical analysis of the discussion to date. It summa-
rizes the limited moral rights protections that American authors have under the
federal statute, which applies to only one category of authors, and the melange
of legal theories in the scattered case law that is purportedly applicable to the
rest. Part I begins with an introduction of the concept of dignity, as under-
stood by significant mention in state and federal law, then proposes a system
in which moral rights, specifically, the right of integrity, would be imple-
mented by giving due regard for the author's dignity. The result of the pro-
posed dignity-based right of integrity would be to broaden the scope of
authors who could seek protection of the right, so as to include more of those
whose works contribute to the arts, and to provide more elaborate protections
for authors' personal rights. Although this undoubtedly would require some
adjustment in the current law and some accommodation, much of the copy-
right laws would be left intact.2' In the end, what is proposed for consider-
ation is a development of a moral rights doctrine that would demand respect
for the author's work under an evolving American copyright system that orig-
inally was implemented with different priorities than one with moral rights of
the author at the center.
ff. Moral Rights and the American Analogue
A. Moral Rights International
The doctrine of moral rights recognizes that an author has certain per-
sonal rights that stem from being the creator of a work; such rights are inde-
pendent of pecuniary or economic interests in the tangible work product and
remain withthe author even after anytransfer ofownership.Y Moral rights pre-
background sources are Amarnick, supra note 15; Russell 3. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the
Amoral Copyright: A Comparison ofArfists'Rights in France and the United States, 28 BULL.
CoPYRIGHr Soc'y 1 (1980); John Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27
HASTNGS L.J. 1023 (1976); Raymond Sarraute, Current Theory on the MoralRight ofAuthors
andArtists UnderFrench Law, 16 AM. J. CoMP. L. 465 (1968); and James M. Treece,American
Law Analogues oftheAuthor's 'MoralRight," 16 AM. J. CoMP. L. 487 (1968). Thorough and
informative among more recent literature are Damich, The Right ofPersonality, supra note 22,
and Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Righ supra note 17. A third, Lawrence Adam Beyer,
Intentionalism,Ar4 and the Suppression ofInnovation: Film Colorization and the Philosophy
of Moral Rights, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 1011 (1988), is one of the leading pieces skeptical of the
virtues of moral rights protection. Lastly, recommended post-VARA works include Cotter,
supra note 15; Sheldon W. Halpern, OfMoralRightandMoralRighteousness, 1 MARQ..INTIL
PROP. L. REV. 65 (1997); and Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, How Fine Art Fares Post VAPA, 1
MARQ. hTL. PROP. L. REV. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Kwal, How Fine Art Fares Post VARA].
26. For example, the proposed dignity-based right of integrity would be subject to the fair
use doctrine. See infra text accompanying notes 259-61.
27. See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77,81 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that moral
rights protect artists from change or mutilation of their work even after transfer). Although the
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sume that the author's creative process not only results in a tangible product
that is subject to the demands of, and mobility within, the marketplace, but
also reflects the personality' and "self'2 of the author, indeed, her creative
soul." The specific substantive protections under the moral rights rubric
differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,31 but such protections are generally
understood to include, chiefly and most simply, the rights of disclosure,
attribution, and integrity.32 The disclosure right provides that, as the master
of the work, only the author can determine when her work is complete and
commentary often describes moral rights as non-economic rights, see, e.g., Kwall, How Fine
Art Fares Post VARA, supra note 25, at 1, some have stated that moral rights are related to an
author's economic rights, see, e.g., Amanick, supra note 15, at 31. For an examination of the
economic aspects of author's moral rights, see generally Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli,
Authors' andArtists 'MoralRights: A ComparativeLegal andEconomicAnaysis,26 J. LEGAL
STUD. 95 (1997); Laura A. Pitta, Economic andMoral Rights Under U.S. CopyrightLaw: Pro-
tectingAuthors and Producers in the Motion Picture Industry, ENT. & SPORTS LAW. Winter
1995, at 3.
28. See 1 JOHNHENRYMERRYMAN&A BERTE. ELSENLAW, ETI-CS AND THE VISUAL
ARTS 145 (1987) ("The primary justification for the protection of moral rights is the idea that
the work of art is an extension of artist's personality, an expression of his innermost being. To
mistreat the work of art is to mistreat the artist, to invade his area of privacy, to impair his
personality."); Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, supra note 16, at 955 ("Moral
rights derive from the fact that a work is an expression of the artist's personality."); Katz, supra
note 15, at 388 ("An author's interests of personality are much more a part of the fabric of his
creation than are those of an inventor of an industrial or commercial process.. . ."); Roeder,
supra note 25, at 557 ("[W]hen an artist reates... he does more than bring into the world a
unique object having only exploitive possibilities; he projects into the world part of his person-
ality."); Sarraute, supra note 25, at 465 ("[The moral right] includes non-property attributes...
[that] give legal expression to the intimate bond which exists between a literary or artistic work
and its author's personality.").
29. See Katz, supra note 15, at 380-81, 401-02 ("[I]s not literary property the outward
manifestation of the creator's inner-self?"); Neil Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions
and the Enhancement ofAuthor Autonomy: A Normative Evaluation, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 347,
402-03 (1993) (naming this "self defining expression" or "self-realization").
30. See Halpern, supra note 25, at 65 ("[T]he soul of the 'artist[ ]' creat[es] a unity
between the creator and the creation.").
31. There appears to be no universal consensus on the proper extent of the substantive
moral rights. For an excellent discussion of the extent of moral rights protections in various
civil law countries, see Adolf Dietz, The Moral Right of theAuthor: MoralRights and the Civil
Law Countries, 19 CoLUM.-VLA J.L. &ARTS 199 (1995).
32. See Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right, supra note 17, at 5; Kwall, How Fine Art
Fares Post VARA, supra note 25, at 1; Netanel, supra note 29, at 383; Sidney A. Diamond,
Legal Protection for the 'MoralRights" ofAuthors and Other Creators, 68 TRADEMARK REP.
244,244 (1978); see also William Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author, 4 AM . COMP. L.
506, 507 (1955) (noting that Berne Convention encompasses both paternity right and right to
integrity of works). Some jurisdictions provide for additional rights. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 46- 49.
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when it is ready for publication and public review. 3 Once the work is pub-
lished, the right of attribution34 ensures that the author (and no one else) will
receive attribution as its creator. Related to the right of attribution is the
protection from misattribution, 35 which protects authors against attribution to
works they did not create, and the right to demand anonymous or pseudony-
mous authorship.36 Lastly, the right of integrity, which most underscores the
personality interest of the author37 and is the focus ofthis Article's proposal, 8
protects against significant alteration of the work or such derogatory use of it
that is contrary to the author's intentions." Important in any discussion of
33. See Damich, The Right ofPersonalify, supra note 22, at 7; Kwall, Copyright and the
MoralRight, supra note 17, at 5-6; Kwall, How Fine Art Fares Post VARA, supra note 25, at 1.
34. The commentary suggests that "right of attribution" is gaining popularity as the pre-
ferred term over "right of paternity," the original term and one that commentators in significant
number still use. A leading authority on copyright notes the "sexist underpinnings" of the latter
term, "not to mention its confusion over when gestation occurs." NIMMER, supra note 16,
§ 8D.01 [A], at 8D-5 n.8.
35. See Cotter, supra note 15, at 12 (noting types of attribution rights)."
36. See id.; Kwall, How Fine Art Fares Post VARA, supra note 25, at 1. Perhaps few
authors could be stronger advocates of the right of attribution than law professors, whose desire
for attribution and citation is fueled by the belief that "large numbers of citations to a publica-
tion are strong evidence of its scholarly influence." Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law
Review Articles, 73 CAL. L. Rgv. 1540, 1543 (1985). Professor Herma Hill Kay added the
following (in light fare):
If you're cited, that means you're identified as a player in the game: a scholar of
significance. Your academic stock goes up, and you're sure to get an invitation to
visit - yes, maybe even as a scholar-in-residence - at leading law schools. The
more you're cited, the more likely it becomes that a bidding war will break out over
you. If you're not cited, that means you're a know-nothing upstart ....
Henna Hill Kay, In Defense of Footnotes, 32 ARIZ. L. REv. 419,426 (1990). Thus, few legal
scholars are likely to decline attribution for authored articles. The exceptions to this are extra-
ordinary and truly understandable. See, e.g., Cato Tonic, The LastRefuge of Scoundrels: Selec-
tive Literalism in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 78 B.U. L. REv. 67 (1998) ("[An] affirmative
constitutional grant of power, seemingly addressed to Mr. Clinton individually, is that 'Bill...
shall... lay any... Imports' - language that arguably reaches interns brought in from Califor-
nia.") (citation omitted).
37. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing personality interest of author).
38. Of the multiple rights included within moral rights protections, it is the integrity right
that has been described as the "most dramatic," Roeder, supra note 25, at 565, "most contro-
versial," ArthurL. Stevenson, Jr.,MoralRight andthe CommonLaw: A Proposal, 6 COPYRIGHT
L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 89, 101 (1955), "most important," MERRYMAN & ELSe, supra note 28, at
143, "the central tenet of moral rights jurisprudence," Netanel, supra note 29, at 387, lying "at
the heart of the moral rights doctrine," Kwall, How Fine Art Fares Post VARA, supra note 25,
at 1, and indeed, "often deemed to constitute the whole doctrine," Roeder, supra note 25, at 565.
39. NBIME,, supra note 16, § 8D.04[A][1], at 8D-49; Damich, The Right ofPersonaliy,
supra note 22, at 15.
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moral rights is the alienability and duration of such rights.40 Jurisdictions with
the most advanced moral rights protection provide that moral rights are
inalienable (and thus not subject to the author's transfer or waiver)41 and are
perpetual, thereby surviving the author (to the author's heirs) as well as the
duration of copyright term.42
Within the international community, France is the undisputed champion
of authors' moral rights, ou enfranfais, le droit moral.43 Art is "one of the
glories of France."' The droit moral commands respect for the auteur, the
artist's work, and the creative process,45 and French authors receive the full
panoply of moral rights. In addition to the rights of disclosure, attribution,
and integrity, French law recognizes the right to create and not to create,46 and
the right to withdraw the work from the public;47 the jurisdiction also provides
for protection from excessive criticism, 4' and less frequently, protection
40. See Netanel, supra note 29 (discussing copyright alienability and author autonomy).
41. See Darmich, The Right ofPersonalty, supra note 22, at 7 (using France as example);
DaSilva, supra note 25, at 16-17 (same).
42. See Cotter, supra note 15, at 12 (discussing moral rights doctrine in France); Damich,
The Right ofPersonality, supra note 22, at 7 (same).
43. Diamond, supra note 32, at 245; Halpern, supra note 25, at 71 n.30. On the French
droit moral generally, see DaSilva, supra note 25; Jane Ginsburg, French Copyright Law: A
Comparative Overview, 36 J. COPYRIGMrS Soc'Y 269 (1989); Sarraute, supra note 25.
44. Tyson & Brother-United Theatre Ticket Offices v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418,447 (1927)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
45. See Dane S. Ciolino, Rethinking the Compatibility ofMoralRights and Fair Use, 54
WASIL & LEE L. REv. 33,40 (1997) ("The French legislature has characterized the attribution
right as the artist's right to 'respect for his name, his authorship."' (quoting Law No. 57-298 of
March 11, 1957, art. 19, p. 2723, amended by Law No. 85-660 of July 3, 1985, J.O., July 4,
1985, p. 7495, translated in United Nations Educ, Scientific and Cultural Org., Copyright Laws
and Treaties of the World, France section, item 1, art. 6 (1992))); Cotter, supra note 15, at 11
& n.43 (noting French courts' recognition of "the droit au respect de l'oeuvre, literally 'the
right to respect of the work"').
46. The right not to create stems from the French understanding of the "artisan." Strauss,
supra note 32, at 511 & n.24; Tal Vigderson, Comment, Hamletff: The Sequel? The Rights
ofAuthors vs. Computer-Generated "Read-Alike" Works, 28 LoY. L-.- L. REv. 401,436 &
n.224 (1994). This right would have been germane in a rather bizarre alleged incident of
compulsory artistic service involving Jong Il Kim, the current head of North Korea. Years
before assuming his current position, Kim, a movie buff; reportedly ordered the kidnapping of
a South Korean movie director and his actress wife, for the purpose of having on his staff one
who could produce movies to Kim's liking. After making a series of propaganda films for Kim,
the director and his wife escaped. For a press account, see Michael S. Serrill, All the Makings
of a Great Movie (South Korean Actress and Director Escape North Korean Kidnappers),
TIME, May 26, 1986, at 35, available at 1986 WL 2336259.
47. Some question the usefulness of this right See, e.g., Sarraute, supra note 25, at 477.
48. See Beyer, supra note 25, at 1023; Roeder, supra note 25, at 556.
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against destruction of tfie created work.49 Moral rights in France are inalien-
able and perpetual.50 Interestingly, although France is regarded as a civil law
jurisdiction with legal norms declared by the civil code rather than judge-
made rules seen in common law jurisdictions, the droit moral originated from
the French courts in the nineteenth century, 5 and have since been codified.
52
Authors' moral rights gained international acceptance in 1928, when the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne
Convention) added to its provisions the rights of attribution and integrity.s"
Still the most influential international copyright treaty, article 6bis of the
current Berne Convention provides:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer
of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the
work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of,
or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be
prejudicial to his honor or reputation.'
The United States had declined to join the original Bene Convention when
it was formed in 1886, and the treaty's inclusion of moral rights fbrther
discouraged American acquiescence.5" The convention as a whole was seen
49. Professor Cotter notes that although the French Code does not explicitly provide for
protection against destruction, some courts have extended such protection. Cotter, supra note
15, at 13 n.60. Commentators have argued that although alteration might affect the author's
right of integrity, destruction would be less of an infringement of her personality. See Kwall,
Copyright and the MoralRight, supra note 17, at 9 & nn.33-34.
50. See Damich, The ViualArtistsRightsActof1990,supra note 16, at 967-68 & n.113
(noting inalienability of moral rights in France); Jane C. Ginsburg, Ownership of Electronic
Rights and the Private InternationalLaw of Copyright, 22 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 165,173
& n.33 (1998) (same); Netanel, supra note 29, at 381 & n.156 (stating that moral rights in
France are inalienable and perpetual).
51. See Merryman, supra note 25, at 1026 ("It is interesting to note that the moral right
of the artists in French law is entirely judicial in origin."); Sarraute, supra note 25, at 466
("[T]he real credit... belongs to the courts, who played a more important role than did the
academic theorists.").
52. See Dietz, supra note 31, at 201-02; see also Damich, The VisualArtists RightsAct
of 1990, supra note 16, at 967-68; Jane C. Ginsburg, supra note 50, at 173; Netanel, supra note
29, at 381.
53. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept 9, 1886,
art. 6bis, as last revised, Paris, July 24, 1971,25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221,235 [hereinaf-
ter Beme Convention]. The Berne Convention was initially adopted in 1886. Moral rights
protections were adopted as part of the Rome Amendments in 1928. The right of disclosure was
not included; apparently such right was thought to be "too delicate and controversial a matter
to be within the province of the Convention." Stevenson, supra note 38, at 108.
54. Berne Convention, supra note 53, art. 6bis(1). The specifics of remedies and enforce-
ment, like several other matters under the convention, are left to the member nations. Id. art.
6bis(3).
55. See H. REP. No. 101-514, at 7 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 6915,6917.
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as incompatible with the U.S. copyright scheme, and article 6bis became a
"major new obstacle" to American approval. 6 It is a fair statement that those
who commercially exploit the works of authors (e.g., publishers and motion
picture producers and distributors), all of whom would be economically dis-
advantaged by enforcement of extensive moral rights protections, were suc-
cessful in their lobbying efforts. It was not until 1988 that the United States,
under some international pressure and seeking to protect American authors'
interests abroad, agreed to join the international treaty, initially through the
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 (BCIA)' Two years later,
Congress enacted VARA, the first federal legislation recognizing the personal
rights of artists, though limited to certain authors.5 8
B. American Judicial Response to Droit Moral
Before the enactments in BCIA and VARA, American courts had ample
opportunity to address the matter of authors' non-economic rights in a number
of cases. The case law clearly reflects two judicial positions: the refusal to
adopt the moral rights doctrine seen in civil law jurisdiction59 and reliance on
56. Orrin G. Hatch, Better Late than Never: Implementation of the 1886Berne Conven-
tion, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 171, 175 (1989); see id. at 184 ("At the outset of the 100th Con-
gress, the 'moral rights' obstacle remained in the path of legislation to implement the [Berne]
Convention.").
57. Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 2(3), 102 Stat. 2853 (1988) (published in notes following 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1994)). For commentaries by members of Congress on the activity leading up
to the enactment, see Hatch, supra note 56; Carlos J. Moorehead, HA 2962: The Berne
Convention Implementation Act of1987, 3 J.L. & TEC-L 187 (1988); Charles McC. Mathias, It.,
S. 2904 and the Berne Convention, 3 J.L. & TEcH. 197 (1988).
58. As Professor Halpem summarized, it was the decade of the 1980s that saw unprece-
dented discussion of moral rights, and action in the legislatures. Halpern, supra note 25, at 66.
High profile celebrities, like directors John Huston and Woody Allen among others, made pas-
sionate pleas for protection against the "colorization" of black and white movies. See infra text
accompanying notes 292-303. This spawned substantial interest and discussion in the law re-
views, see generally Beyer, supra note 25, often by student authors. See generallyAnne Marie
Cook, Note, The Colorization ofBlack and White Films: An Example of the Lack of Substan-
tive Protection forArt in the United States, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 309 (1988); Michael C.
Penn, Comment, Colorization of Films: Painting a Moustache on the 'Mona Lisa"?, 58 U.
CN. L. REV. 1023 (1990); Dan Renberg, Comment, The Money of Color: Film Colorization
and the 100th Congress, 11 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 391 (1989); Michael Sissine Wan-
tuck, NoteArtisticIntegrity, PublicPolicy and Copyright: Colorization Reduced toBlackand
White, 50 OHIo ST. L.J. 1013 (1989); Anna S. White, Comment, The Colorization Dispute:
Moral Rights Theory as a Means of Judicial and Legislative Reform, 38 EMORY L.. 237
(1989); Craig A Wagner, Note, Motion Picture Colorization, Authenticity, and the Elusive
MoralRight, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 628 (1989).
59. E.g., (illim v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14,24 (2d Cir. 1976) ("Amer-
ican copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize moral rights or provide a cause of
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American analogues to provide for equivalent rights.'" As to the former, some
courts characterize the plaintiff's moral rights claim as one under foreign law,
and reject its applicability stateside. Illustrative is the decision in Vargas v.
Esquire, In.," one ofthe earlier cases involving authors' moral rights. There,
the court stated that "what are called 'moral rights' of the author, said to be
those necessary for the protection of his honor and integrity" is "the law of
foreign countries."'62 Quoting from the very treatise relied on by the plaintiff,
the court stated that "[tihe conception of 'moral rights' of authors so flly rec-
ognized and developed in the civil law countries has not yet received accep-
tance inthe law ofthe United States.
' 3
Yet as Nimmer notes, pronouncements such as those in Vargas might
give the false impression that authors have no protections of non-economic
personal rights, when in fact, "stirrings of moral rights can be discerned in
American judicial decisions and statutes."'  Of the various rights that Amer-
action for their violation, since the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than the personal,
rights of authors."); Miller v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 299 F.2d 706, 709 n.5 (2d Cir.
1962) ("[T]he moral right, as such, is not recognized in this country."); Crimi v. Rutgers Presb.
Church, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813, 819 (1949) ("[T]he claim.. that an artist retains rights in his work
after it has been unconditionally sold, where such rights are related to the protection of his
artistic reputation, is not supported by the decision of our courts.").
60. E.g., Johnson v. Tuff-N-Rumble Mgmt, Inc.,No. 99-1374, 2000 WL 1808486, at *4
n.1 (ED. La. Dec. 8,2000) (citing NMMBR,supra note 16, at § 8D.01[A]); Edison v. Viva Int'l
Ltd., 70 A.D.2d 379, 384, 421 N.Y.S.2d 203, 206 (1979) (citing Seroff v. Simon & Schuster,
162 N.Y.S.2d 770,774 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957), aff'd, 210 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1960)).
61. 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947).
62. Id. at 526. As Professor Merryman noted, "Since the notion of moral right is foreign
in origin, it seems reasonable to ask whether it is in some basic sense alien to American ideals
and experiences." Menyman, supra note 25, at 1043. One commentator suggests axenophobic
tendency in the case opinions, since the "moral doctrine is itself foreign and inappropriate for
a common law country." Amarnick, supra note 15, at 73.
63. Vargas,164 F.2d at 526 (quoting 2 STEPHENP. LADAS, THINTERNATIONALPRoTEc-
ION OF LIERARY ANDARISTIC PROPERTY § 367,802(1938)). Indeed, the Ladas text stated,
"No such right is referred to by legislation, court decisions or writers." LADAB, supra, at 802.
The difference in the law led to diametrically different results in actions resulting from the same
facts. A group of Russian composers protesting the use of their music and their names in the
credit line of a film with anti-Soviet themes prevailed on their moral rights claim in France after
New York courts rejected that same claim.. Compare Soc. Le Chant du Monde v. Soc. Fox
Europe, [1953] Recueil Dalloz [[D. Jur.] 16, 80 (Cour d'appel, Paris), with Shostakovich v.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1948), a'd, 87 N.Y.S2d 430 (1949).
Movie director John Huston failed in his attempts to lobby Congress to enact legislation
prohibiting the "colorization" of his films made in black and white, but his heirs succeeded in
convincing the French courts to award damages forthe showing ofHuston's TheAsphaltJungle
on French television, on droitmoral grounds. See Halper, supra note 25, at 69.
64. NMdER, supra note 16, § 8D.02[A], at 8D-10. The description of the development
of moral rights in American case law occasionally invites vinous references. See id. ("The time-
honored judicial practice of distilling new wine in old bottles has resulted in an increasing ac-
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ican law purportedly protects, it is the integrity right - the focus of this Arti-
cle - that is the "source of the greatest concern in American discussion on the
moral right."65  Commentators have pointed out that an author's right of
integrity receives protection under American analogues of unfair competition
(including Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act), contract, defamation, and pri-
vacy-" In practice, the most successful claims for the author appear to be in
contract or unfair competition. At least in theory, the right of integrity may
be best secured by contract, following Zechariah Chafee's advice: "[A]ny
copyright owner who really cares about his moral rights can always protect
them by inserting appropriate clauses in his contracts with publishers and
producers, for example, by expressly forbidding any alterations or omissions
made without his consent."'  Any breach of the provision resulting in impair-
ment of integrity can then be left to the courts for contractual interpretation.
Yet as commentators have alerted, this approach assumes equal bargaining
power, when in practice, many authors are not in the position to negotiate
inclusion of a term for the right of integrity.'
cretion of case law in some degree according to the substance of moral rights .... "); Stevenson,
supra note 38, at 111 ("It might be that in the fullness of time we would develop enough cases
so that bringing moral right into our law would be simply a matter of putting the old wine in
new bottles.").
65. Amamick, supra note 15, at 32.
66. NIMMER, supra note 16, § 8D.02, at 8D-10; Damich, The Right ofPersonality, supra
note 22, at 38-71; Kwall, Copyright and the MoralRight, supra note 17, at 18-23. Some com-
mentators have confidently stated that American analogues provide for moral rights protections
equalto those of the French droit moral. The most direct case for this view was by the Attorney
Advisor of the Copyright Office of the Library of Congress who wrote in 1955: "There is a
considerable body of precedent in the American decisions to afford to our courts ample
foundations in the common law for the protection of the personal rights of authors to the same
extent that such protection is given abroad under the doctrine of moral right." Strauss, supra
note 32, at 538 (emphasis added). The commentary includes similar views. See Stevenson,
supra note 38, at 110 ("Our law... has recognized moral rights of creators within the scope of
the doctrine of libel, unfair competition, right of privacy, and general principles of equity
jurisprudence."); Treece, supra note 25, at 505 ("There are American law analogues of the
French moral right;" "[q]uite clearly a right to the integrity of an artistic work is evolving in the
United States."). For a more current analysis of the various common law theories and how
moral rights claims fared under them, see Damich, The Right of Personality, supra note 22, at
38-71; Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right, supra note 17, at 18-23.
67. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: 1I, 45 CoLubM L. REV.
719, 729 (1945). The statement was from one whose view on the relative urgency of moral
rights protections is evident from the following observation: 'Tor the time being, we had better
concentrate our energies on the pecuniary aspects of copyright. We have enough trouble there.
After we get the issues of dollars and cents settled satisfactorily, we can go on to moral rights."
Id.
68. Cotter, supra note 15, at 80; DaSilva, supra note 25, at 56; Kwall, Copyright and the
Moral Right, supra note 17, at 26-27; Russ VerSteeg, FederalMoralRightsfor VisualArtists:
Contract Theory andAnabsis, 67 WAsH. L. REV. 827, 843 (1992).
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Whether or not included in the contract, Ninimer cites to "certain early
decisions that an author has the right to prevent distortion or truncation of his
work,"69 which right "matured to full copyright status in the landmark case of
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies."7 There, members of the
British comedy group Monty Python brought an action against the American
Broadcasting Company (ABC), seeking to enjoin the network's airing of an
edited version of the group's program," which omitted 24 minutes of the
original 90-minute show. 2 The court of appeals reversed the district court's
order denying the motion for preliminary injunction, but not on moral rights
grounds." The court declared that "American copyright law ... does not
recognize moral rights or provide a cause of action for their violation, since
the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than the personal rights of
authors."'74 Nevertheless, the court of appeals ruled that since ABC's editing
had indeed impaired the integrity of the authors' work,15 the plaintiffs were
entitled to injunctive relief on the independent ground that the heavily edited
69. NMMEI, supra note 16, § 8D.04[A][1], at 8D-49 (citing Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d
585, 589 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J., concurring); Autry v. Republic Prods., Inc., 213 F.2d 667
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 858 (1954); Harms, Inc. v Tops Music Enters., Inc., 160 F.
Supp. 77 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Chelser v. Avon Book Div., Hearst Pubs., Inc., 352 N.Y.S.2d 552
(1973); Preminger v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 267 N.Y.S.2d 594 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), afd, 269
N.Y.S.2d 913, afd, 18 N.Y.2d 659 (1966); Stevens v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 148 U.S.P.Q. 755
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1966)).
70. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). For a contemporary discussion of the case, see Note,
Protection of Artistic Integrity: Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 473 (1976).
71. ABC had already broadcast one of the shows. Plaintiffs later saw the program and
"were allegedly 'appalled' at the discontinuity and 'mutilation' that had resulted from the
editing." Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 18.
72. In their motion for a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs advanced two grounds, one
on copyright infringement under the copyright statute and the other under the Lanham Act. Id.
at 19, 24.
73. The district court denied the motion for the preliminary injunction on the grounds:
that it was unclear who owned the copyright in the programs produced by BBC
from the scripts written by Monty Python; that there was a question of whether
Time-Life and BBC were indispensable parties to the litigation; that ABC would
suffer significant financial loss if it were enjoined a week before the scheduled
broadcast; and that Monty Python had displayed a "somewhat disturbing casual-
ness" in their pursuance of the matter.
Id. at 18. The Court ofAppeals reversed because it disagreed with the district court's findings.
Id. at 19,22,25.
74. Id. at24.
75. Id. at 25. The district court found that the plaintiffs established "an impairment of the
integrity of their work," which caused the program "to lose its iconoclastic verve." Id. at 18
(quoting Judge Lasker).
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version of the show constituted "an actionable mutilation of [their] work '"7
under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which protects against a representa-
tion of a product that creates a false impression of the product's origin." Es-
sentially, Gilliam has been regarded as the most celebrated victory for authors,
the pinnacle of moral rights protections,"8 though under Lanham Act clothing.
The plaintiffs' averment of being "appalled" at ABC's mutilation79 and their
general allegation that "defendant ha[d] presented to the public a 'garbled' ...
distorted version of plaintiff's work,"8" are protestations commonly seen in an
author's claim of a violation of the integrity right.8 The court's characteriza-
tion of the defendant's editing, without consent, "into a form that departs sub-
stantially from the original work,"'m and its decision in favor of the plaintiffs
appear to be recognition of the central moral right of integrity.83
76. Id. at 23-24.
77. Id. at 24 (citing Rich v. RCA Corp., 390 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)). Another
ground for the decision was copyright infringement, in light of the contractual prohibition on
editing. Id. at 19. The contents of the show were originally written for broadcast by the BBC.
Monty Python and the BBC's arrangement allowed BBC to make minor changes in the script,
but nothing in the arrangement entitled BBC to alter a program once recorded. Id. at 17. BBC
was permitted, under the same agreement, to license the shows to other countries, subject to the
editing prohibition. Id. BBC's agreement with Time-Life for the distibution of the Monty
Python shows allowed Time-Life to edit the program only "for insertion of commercials,
applicable censorship or governmental... rules and regulations, and National Association of
Broadcasters and time segment requirements." Id. at 18.
78. See Amarnick, supra note 15, at 62 (describing Gilliam as "[t]he fullest exposition
of the use of the Lanaham Act to protect an artist against distorting the editing of a work");
Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right, supra note 17, at 20-21 (describing Gilliam as "an
extremely favorable decision for creators"); see also Seshadri v. Kasraian, 130 F.3d 798, 803
(7th Cir. 1997) (including Gilliam in authorities that support "glimmers of the moral-rights
doctrine in contemporary American copyright law").
79. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 18.
80. Id. at 24-25. The court opinion notes that the three members of the court separately
viewed the edited version and the original versions. Id. "We find that the truncated version at
times omitted the climax of the skits to which [plaintiffs'] rare brand of humor was leading and
at other times deleted essential elements in the schematic development of a story line." Id. at
25.
81. "'To deform his work is to present him to the public as the creator of a work not his
own, and thus makes him subject to criticism for work he has not done.'" Id. at 24 (quoting
Roeder, supra note 25, at 569).
82. Id. The court noted that the defendant "represented to the public as the product of
[the plaintiffs] what was actually a mere caricature of their talents." Id. at 25.
83. Results in cases like Gilliam became part of the legal mix on which Congress relied
in 1988 to declare that American law was sufficient to protect authors' non-economic rights.
S. REP. No. 100-352, at 9-10 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C-AN. 3706, .3714-15. This
resolved the major obstacle to American ratification of the Berne Convention, namely, the con-
cem over the impact of the convention's Article 6bis on American law. Yet, the conclusion that
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Nevertheless, there have been serious questions about the impact that
Gilliam would have on American law,s and those questions appear to remain
today. One commentator noted that Gilliam "has not been widely followed,"
and that subsequent judicial references to it are "not for the proposition that
a cause of action can be based on violation of the author's moral rights."85
Gilliam also set a high standard. As Professor Roberta Kwall observed, an
integrity right is not enforced unless the mutilation is substantial,"6 and sub-
sequent cases support this view." Gilliam proved to fall short of expectations,
and dimensions of the author's right of integrity continued to be uncertain.8
American law up to 1988 adequately protected the moral rights of authors is troublesome. See
Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, supra note 16, at 945-46. & n.5 (describing
Congressional position as "dubious" and citing contrary testimony).
Confidence in 1988 in the American analogues of civil law moral rights protections did
not prevent enactment of the first federal moral rights statute shortly thereafter, the same cannot
be said for previous statements of confidence in U.S. law, which may have led to delay in, or
halt of, the development of authors' moral rights. For example, in 1955, William Strauss,
Attorney Advisor of the Copyright Office wrote, "There is a considerable body of precedent in
the American decisions to afford to our courts ample foundations in the common law for the
protection of the personal rights of authors to the same extent that such protection is given
abroad under the doctrine of moral right" Strauss, supra note 32, at 538. Strauss explained
that "the contention of some writers that the author's rights of personality are not sufficiently
protected in the United States... seem to be dispelled by close scrutiny of the court decisions."
Id. Strauss' views were sharply criticized, occasionally drawing comments that they deserved
partial blame for Congressional inaction on explicit moral rights protections. Amarnick, supra
note 15, at 67; Diamond, supra note 32, at 280; Merryman, supra note 25, at 1037-39.
84. See Diamond, supra note 32, at 269 (referring to "marked differences of opinion
among commentators, the strong dissent' and prior Second Circuit case law).
85. Damich, The Right ofPersonality, supra note 22, at 3 n.7.
86. Kwall, Copyright and the MoralRight, supra note 17, at 21.
87. See Playboy Enters., v. Dumas, 831 F. Supp. 295,316-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), modified
on other grounds, 840 F. Supp. 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd inpar4 rev'd in part, 53 F.3d 549
(2d Cir. 1995) (dismissing copyright owner's counterclaim under Section 43(a) where defendant
failed to show magazine's alterations to four often posters "converted or 'garbled' [the artist's]
works into something new" or were "substantial enough to mislead the public as to the posters'
origins"); Considine v. Penguin, U.SA, No. 91 Civ. 4405,1992 WL 183762, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y.
July 20, 1992) (granting summary judgment against author on Section 43(a) claim alleging
errors in edited excerpt of author's book, where "the distortion of the work is minimal compared
with Gilliam"); Lish v. Harper's Mag. Found., 807 F. Supp. 1090, 1105-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(dismissing writer's Section 43(a) claim where plaintiff failed to show that magazine's edited
version of writer's letter, deleting nearly half of original text, "substantially distorted the
original").
88. Perhaps this is evident from the manner in which the court that decided Gilliam
resolved the appeal of Choe v. Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law, 81 F.3d 319 (2d Cir. 1996) (per
curiam), affig, 920 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Five years after enactment of VARA and
twenty years after Gilliam, the district court in Choe had before it an action brought by the
author of a law journal comment who alleged that the journal's editors had distorted and
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Thus, presently, unless an author's right of integrity falls within the narrow
strictures of VARA, or within contract terms that give the author significant
protection against alteration without consent, the author must mold her
allegation of a violation of integrity into some recognizable claim within the
melange89 or patchwork' of theories. Unfair competition claims, which
provide varying levels of protection," all far less favorable to authors than
protective measures seen in civil law countries, are probably the most com-
mon such attempts? 2
C. American Skepticism and Suspicion
Undoubtedly contributing to the limited moral rights protection under
U.S. law (and perhaps to the view that American protections of authors' non-
economic rights are sufficient) is the view by some that moral rights are simply
not desirable in the American legal systemY3 Professor Robert Gorman's
declaration provides an encapsulated statement of the multiple concerns of
adopting an expanded moral rights plan, and is probably the most damning:
mutilated his work. Choe, 920 F. Supp. at 45. In dismissing the action, the court stated, "There
is no federal claim for violation of plaintiff's alleged 'moral rights.'" Id. at 49. The Court of
Appeals affirmed in a per curiam opinion:
Jerry Choe appeals from a grant of summary judgment by Judge Mukasey dismiss-
ing his complaint against Fordham University School of Law and the Fordham
Internatinoal Law Journal. The complaint alleges a "mangling" of his student
comment by the Journal's editors so severe as to constitute a false designation of
origin under the Lanham Act and a violation of Choe's "droit moral." It further
alleges various state law torts.
We affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court, Choe v.
Fordham Univ. Sch. ofLaw, 920 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y.1995).
81 F.3d at 319.
89. Amamick, supra note 15, at 61.
90. Id. at 36; Kwal, Colright and the MoralRight, supra note 17, at 18; Netanel, supra
note 29, at 393.
91. Kwall, Copyright and the MoralRight, supra note 17, at23.
92. See Damich, TheRightofPersonaliy, supra note 22, at 74-75 (comparing French and
American law); Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right, supra note 17, at 23 (comparing
protection afforded by countries with strong moral rights regimes with American law).
93. Perhaps the most skeptical of the virtues of adopting the moral rights doctrine is
Beyer, supra note 25, at 1110-11 (stating that "[tihe initial appeal of the concept of artists'
'moral rights' evaporates under careful scrutiny" and describing integrity right as "a stirring
rhetorical wrapper for an expandable bundle of basically unnecessary and unjustified interest
group preferences"). See also John A. Baumgarten, On the Case Against Moral Rights, in
MORAL RiGors PROTECTON 1A COI'YRIr SYSTEM 87 (Peter Anderson & David Saunders
eds., 1992); Stephen L. Carter, Owning WhatDoesn'tExist, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 99,
101-02 (1990); William W. Fisher II, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1661,1773 n.494 (1988).
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[C]omprehensive [moral rights] legislation is likely to be ill-advised. It is
likely to be impracticable in its application, to be unsettling in its impact
upon longstanding contractual and business arrangements, to threaten
investment in and public dissemination ofthe arts, to sharply conflict with
fundamental United States legal principles ofcopyright, contract, property
and evenconstitutional law, andultimatelyto stifle much artistic creativity
while resulting in onlythe most speculative incentives to such creativity."
Professor Gorman's statement, similar to that of other authors, reflects the
grave concerns of the consequences of the American adoption of the French
droit moral.9' Gorman's points deserve attention, not only for the substance
of his cautions, but also in the search for a meaningful moral rights system
that would avoid the ominous results that commentators portend. The concern
for the unsettling impact on longstanding business and commercial arrange-
ments that a new system would bring appears to speak more to the virtues of
the status quo and to the great force of inertia that has continued to keep the
authors' personal rights a low priority. This argument will only gain strength
with each passing year. With regard to the negative impact that a moral rights
doctrine would have on the arts, some commentators join Gorman in his view
that the rule would stifle creativity,96 but another strongly disagrees, taking the
diametrically opposite view.' In any event, it is fair to say that the stifling
effect would be greatly lessened if the duration of the moral rights of authors
(primarily, the right of integrity) were reduced from a perpetual duration to a
finite time period.9"
94. Robert A. Gorman, Federal Moral Rights Legislation: The Need for Caution, 14
NOVA L. REV. 421,422 (1990).
95. Likewise, Judge Leval would "oppose converting our copyright law, by a wave of a
judicial magic wand, into an American droit moral," because "to do so would generate much
unintended mischief" Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1105,
1128 (1990). He points out that American copyright law has served a very different purpose
than the civil counterpart "with rules and consequences that are incompatible with the droit
moral." Id.; see also Beyer, supra note 25, at 1085-88 (criticizing notion of personal rights in
copyright system).
96. See Beyer, supra note 25, at 1049 ("[B]ecause reputation is a product of others' inter-
pretations, and because creativity requires the freedom to interpret existing entities innovatively,
broad personality-based protections for auteurs' reputations would require not only impossible,
but also undesirable, constraints upon others' creativity."); Cotter, supra note 15, at 85 ("Moral
rights... may serve to impose the dead hand of the past on the desires of present and future
generations to forge new experience from existing reality.").
97. E.g., Kwall, Copyright and the MoralRight, supra note 17, at 91 (stating that"federal
recognition for the personal rights of creators would foster creativity [and] protect our cultural
heritage").
98. Germany, for example, is one jurisdiction that provides for authors' moral rights
protections for a limited duration. Cotter, supra note 15, at 12.
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The conflict between a moral rights system and other bodies of law
deserves most careful scrutiny because an author's personal rights must co-
exist with the rights of others. Within the law of copyright itseW there is the
question of the impact of the moral rights rule on other established rules of
copyright law - those relating to derivative works and works made for hire, for
example. Would personal rights supersede all else in copyright, perhaps elim-
inating much of the copyright scheme when the moral rights of an author are
implicated, or is there opportunity for co-existence? With respect to the
relationship between moral rights and contract law, Professor Gorman does not
elaborate on the warning that adoption of the former would conflict with the
fundamental principles ofthe latter. If this statement refers to the concerns of
the inalienability of the droit moral imposed on the American setting, then it
highlights the French prohibition on transfer and waiver ofthe right, which, if
applied stateside, would interfere with the American practice of allowing the
parties in contract (the author and another) to negotiate the terms they wish.
Thus, the moral rights rule would effectively cancel a negotiable term from the
parties' deliberations. Indeed, the traditional rule under U.S. law is that the
author does not retain moral rights in her work unless specifically provided for
inthe contract. Textual silence on the matter ofmoral rights favored the party
opposing the author. Itistlis rulethattheAmerican droit moral would disrupt.
Of all the concerns about the adoption of an elaborate moral rights sys-
tem, the conflict that it would create between the personal rights of the cre-
99. De Bekker v. Frederick A. Stokes Co., 153 N.Y.S. 1066, 1068-69 (N.Y. App. Div.
1915), modified, 157 N.Y.S. 576 (N.Y. App. Div.), affd, 114 N.E. 1064 (N.Y. 1916); Jones v.
Am. Law Book Co., 109 N.Y.S. 706,710 (N.Y. App. Div. 1908); see Clemens v. Press Publ'g
Co., 122 N.Y.S. 206,207 (N.Y. App. Term 1910) (holding that upon completion of sale and
delivery of manuscript, author retained no right to compel or prevent publication of article when
publisher wanted to exclude author's name); Robert L. Gordon, Note, Giving the DevilIts Due:
Actors' and Performers'Right to Receive Atiributionfor Cinematic Roles, 4 CARDOZOARTS &
ENT. L.J. 299, 313 (1985) (stating that "the predominant view is that artists must expressly
reserve rights to receive credit, because droitmoral is not recognized in this country").
The contrary view is that a purchaser of literary property cannot do with it what she
wishes, in the absence of contractual language that permits it. Clemens, 122 N.Y.S. at 207-08
(Seabury, J., concurring). In an oft-quoted opinion, Judge Seabury distinguished the nature of
literary property versus that of a barrel of pork, and urged that although "[t]he rights of the
parties are to be determined primarily by the contract which they make ... the interpretation
of the contract is for the court." Id. at 208. He further wrote:
If the intent of the parties was that the defendant should purchase the rights to the
literary property and publish it, the author is entitled, not only to be paid for his
work, but to have it published in the manner in which he wrote it. The purchaser
cannot garble it, or put it out under another name than the author's; nor can he omit
altogether the name of the author, unless his contract with the latter permits him so
to do.
58 WASH. &LEE L. REV 795 (2001)
ative author and the constitutionally-based rights of those who alter or use the
creations should give the most pause. Limitations on traditionally protected
actions based on constitutional law strike at the heart of what is most Amer-
ican. Perhaps most jarring to the American psyche is the idea of an author's
moral right taking precedence over another's property right. The notion that
an artist may, in the name of the personal interests in the work, prevent the
purchaser and holder of title in the work from doing with it what she wishes
may run contrary to the American socio-legal culture and border on the
heretical." 0 Indeed, such a rule applied to existing works might be attacked
as an unconstitutional taking." But the standards of determining when a
constitutional taking is present are unclear,1" and with VARA, there is already
precedent for American recognition of having the rights of one in possession
of property be subject to the right of integrity of such property's creator.
Thus, there already have been inroads in resolving the conflict between the
author's moral rights and the property holder's rights.
Another example of the potential conflict between moral rights and con-
stitutional protections is the author who objects to the alteration or use of her
work by another who, in turn, claims that such alteration or use is parody or
criticism, permitted under the doctrine of fair use.103 Here, implementation of
the traditional droit moral may result in prohibiting actions based on the First
Amendment's right of free expression."°4 VARA addressed this situation by
making moral rights subject to the provision allowing for fair use.0 5
Many ofthe concerns raised against adoption of anAmerican droit moral
indicate that an implementation of a moral rights system is a question of a fit
between legal rules and a socio-legal cultural base. France is a culture with
100. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation"); cf. id. (no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law"); id. amend. XIV ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law"). Note the response of Ted Turner, -when asked
about the opposition to the colorization of movies by their original directors: "The last time I
checked, I own those films." William H. HonanArfists, NewtyMilitan Fightfor Their Rights,
N.Y. TAM, Mar. 3,1988, at C29.
101. Beyer, supra note 25, at 1071-77.
102. Professor Kwall notes that moral rights protections may be implemented without
running afoul of constitutional requirements. Kwall, How Fine Art Fares Post VARA, supra
note 25, at 16-29.
103. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (codification offair use doctrine).
104. The relationship between fair use and FirstAmendment is addressed in Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 555-60 (1985), and explored in James L.
Oakes, Copyrights and Copyremedies: Unfair Use and Injuncions, 18 HOFSTRAL. REV. 983,
989-92 (1990), and James Hall, Comment, Bare-FacedMess: Fair Use and the FirstAmend-
ment, 70 OR. L. REV. 211 (1991).
105. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (1994).
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such appreciation for the arts and respect for the auteur that its legal system
demands the various protections provided in le droft moral,"°e whereas the
American copyright scheme continues to focus on the division of proprietary
interests stemming from created works."°  As Professor Sheldon Halpern
alluded, a jurisdiction's plan of protecting authors' rights depends on the
culture upon which it is based."° By all accounts, the French droit moral (on
the one hand) and the American social, legal, and copyright culture (on the
other) are not compatible suitors."° The forced fitting of the former onto the
latter might well result in "culture shock and aftershock."1
°0
With the concerns of an American droit moral well expressed, two points
are often overlooked or given scantmention. First, as with Professor Gorman's
sweeping statement,"' little is made ofthe author's personality interest in the
creative process - the sheer agony of an author seeing her work altered or
used without regard to her intentions or meaning." 2 Second, often not ad-
dressed is whether a less comprehensive moral rights system that provides for
106. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Fame, 73 IND. L. 1,20 (1997) ("In France,... where
moral rights protections are among the strongest, a cultural tradition exists in which artists are
elevated as a special class of laborers who possess almost spiritual qualities, and their works are
treated as a special category of property."); Halpern, supra note 25, at 69 (referring to "the
French solicitude" for work's auteur).
107. See Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Righ supra note 17, at 2 (referring to "this
country's tradition of safeguarding only thepecuniary rights of a copyright owner"); Kwall, The
Right of Publicio, supra note 17, at 59 (stating that "copyright law in this ountry is inordi-
nately preoccupied with pecuniary, as opposed to personal, interests").
108. Halpern, supra note 25, at 65; see also Damich, The Right ofPersonality, supra note
22, at 5 (stating that "different value systems" explain differences in moral rights regimes of
United States and France).
109. Professor Goldstein describes the differences between the U.S. and European copy-
right cultures thus:
The European culture of copyright places authors at its center, giving them as a
matter of natural right control over every use of their works that may affect their
interests ... By contrast, the American culture of copyright centers on a hard,
utilitarian calculus that balances the needs of copyright producers against the needs
of copyright consumers, a calculus that appears to leave authors at the margins in
the equation
PAUL OoLDSTmN, COpIRGIEHIGHWAY: F.OM GuTEN GTO THE CELEsTAL JUKEBOX 168-
69(1994).
110. Halpem, supra note 25, at 65.
111. See supra text accompanying note 94.
112. See Cotter, supra note 15, at 2 (reporting correspondence between composer Igor
Stravinsky and conductor Ernest Ansermet regarding latter's plan to delete certain portions of
former's Jeu de Cartes, Stravinsky objected, stating, -"better not to play it at all than to do so
reluctantly"). The strong and emotional protests of movie directors against the colorization of
their movies are discussed infra text accompanying notes 292-303.
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meaningful moral rights protections for authors would be more practicable,
less unsettling, and less in conflict with other fields of law."1 A moral rights
system that does not equal the protections provided by the droit moral may
not be so jarring to the rest of the copyright structure. Any examination of a
jurisdiction's adoption of a moral rights system requires consideration of both
(i) the particulars of the legal rules that would descend on a jurisdiction and
(ii) the social and legal culture that the receiving jurisdiction embodies. Much
of the early fervor toward adoption of authors' moral rights emphasized the
virtues of such rights and paid little attention to the cultural base.114 More
recent commentary takes into account the need for cultural base, the question
of an accommodating fit, and considerations of balance." 5
With these lessons in mind, consideration of American moral rights
requires the creation of a system of moral rights (short of the comprehensive
French droit moral) amenable to the socio-legal culture prevalent in the
United States. Likely, there must be some accommodation on each side. The
challenge for moral rights advocates is to propose a system that would seri-
ously protect the author's right of integrity, or the interest in preserving the
personality interests in the created work, in such a way that does not uproot
or disrupt the entire legal culture." 6
113. In a jurisdiction that sees its courts immersed in a "collage of judicial attempts to
come to grips with the problem of moral right in American law," Halpern, supra note 25, at 78,
much of the commentary seems to indicate that the only available American alternatives are
either the adoption of the French droit moral or the current state of moral rights protections.
Before enacting VARA, Congress considered and declined various moral rights proposals. See
Amarnick, supra note 15, at 77 (discussing 1905 proposal); Katz, supra note 15, at 419
(discussing 1940 proposal); Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right, supra note 17, at 29 n.107
(discussing 1979 proposal by Congressman Drinan).
114. E.g.,Katz, supra note 15.
115. See Amarnick, supra note 15, at 35 (encouraging conception of moral rights as
"conglomeration" of several interests in addition to author's "personal interest in his work and
his honor"); Kwall, Copyright and the MoralRight, supra note 17, at 92 ("[T]he integration of
the moral right doctrine into our copyright statute will necessitate balancing the interests of
creators, copyright proprietors, owners of copyrighted works, and the public.").
116. Notwithstanding the legitimate concerns of an American droit moral enacted over-
night, it is somewhat puzzling that legal writers as a group are not more sympathetic to the
rights of authors and artists, especially the integrity right, given their own position as expositors
of original expression. Through their writings, law professors also create. Their written work,
not unlike the creations of artists, reflects the personality and spirit of the authors. Legal aca-
demicians could also be described as a rather territorial and possessive lot when it comes to their
own work product, especially sensitive to certain authorial interests. Indeed, it is not the
uncommon law professor who can recall an experience of submitting an article for publication,
then seeing it (allegedly) butchered, mangled, and mutilated, turned into a distorted version that
no longer reflects what the author intended. The anecdotal evidence is considerable.
One professor reports the horror of seeing in published form the penultimate draft of his
article. Interview with Robert H. Jerry, IL, Missouri Endowed Floyd R. Gibson Professor of
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Law, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law, in Columbia, Missouri (May 10, 2001).
See Robert H. Jerry, H, Introduction to WolfyCreek Symposium, 33 KAN. L. REV. 419 (1985)
(publishing draft of article); Editor's Notes, Erratum,33 KAN. L. REv. (No. 4) vi (1985) (stating
in subsequent issue that editor regretted that author was not provided with opportunity to review
draft before publication). Another professor's protestations against the student editors' changes
of his submitted work led to a most incredible denouement Frustrated with the liberties that
the editors took, the professor declared that the edited article was no longer a representation of
his work and withdrew it from publication. The editors apparently received the statement
literally, and much to the shock of the professor, published under a student author's name a
version of the article specifically rejected by the professor. Only after the threat of a lawsuit,
the law review issued an apology, acknowledging that the article was based on the professor's
submitted work and that the student no longer claimed authorship. Telephone interview with
Bruce A. Markell, Doris S. and Theodore B. Lee Professor of Law, University of Nevada-Las
Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law (May 10, 2001).
The story ofthe late Professor Vaughn C. Ball likely represents one extreme ofwhat results
when the author is displeased with the published product. Professor Ball once submitted an
article, on which he and the editors failed to agree on an acceptable version, and which was
published over his objections. Vaughn C. Ball, The Myth of ConditionalRelevancy, 1977 APIZ.
ST. L.J. 295 [hereinafter Ball 1]. Three years later, Professor Ball submitted a version of the same
article more to his liking to another law journal, which presumably published it in accordance
with his wishes. Vaughn C. Ball, The Myth of Conditional Relevancy, 14 GA. L. REV. 435
(1980) [hereinafter Ball n]. In a footnote in the latter article, he explained that the second piece
was intended to "supersede and replace an article with the same title published by the Arizona
State Law Journal." He continued: "[The previous] article, in its printed form, was disapproved
by me prior to publication, and did not correctly state my views on this subject." Id. at 435 n.*.
In many law libraries, the first page of the article in the Arizona State Law Journal
contains a conspicuously pasted notice in which Professor Ball "disclaims responsibility for the
published article because of changes made during the editing process," and refers the reader to
the authorized version in the Georgia Law Review. Ball , supra, at 295. Professor Ball had
also written a letter to all law libraries possessing the Arizona State volume, explaining his pre-
dicament:
This is to notify you that the [Arizona State] article was published without my
consent and over my protest. It was based on a manuscript written by me at the
request of the Dean of the Arizona State College of Law. By the time of publica-
tion, numerous errors had been inserted by the Journal which mutilated my own
statements and analysis, turned quotation into misquotation, and even citation into
miscitation. These errors were not contained in my manuscript; and the published
version is something I neither wrote nor ever approved. It misrepresents not only
what I said on this subject but also my standards of scholarship and accuracy.
The refusal of the Journal staff and the College o correct the erroneous impres-
sion caused by this publication has forced me to write you this notice in an effort
to reduce the damage that is being caused to me by the circulation of this unautho-
rized version of my article.
Letter from Vaughn C. Ball, Thomas Reade Rootes Cobb Professor of Law, University of
Georgia School of Law, to Mississippi College Law Library (Sept 18, 1979) (on file with
Washington and Lee Law Review).
As to whether the vocal attempts by the author to disassociate himself with the first article
that bears his name were successful, one treatise that refers to Professor's Ball "pathbreaking
article," notes in the citation that the 1977 article was replaced by the 1980 article and gives cita-
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A preliminary suggestion toward an American protection of authors'
rights is nearly as old as the discussion of moral rights itself- to revise the
name. As numerous commentators have observed, "moral rights" is a transla-
tion of the French droit moral,n7 the term droit meaning "law" or "right,"
18
and moral meaning moral, ethical, or having to do with mores."' Yet an
additional definition of moral is "mental" or "intellectual,"' 20 terms that better
convey the underlying theory behind the French moral rights doctrine, that is,
respect for the author, her work, and the creative process, in light of the
author's personal relation with her created work. It is this translation of the
additional term that American observers failed to consider, either through
oversight or volition. American reluctance to protect authors' moral rights
appears to stem in part from the use of the term "moral" and the suggestion to
give legal status to an author's notion of proper mores. One of the most vocal
advocates of moral rights" sought to dispel this notion in 1952: "It is bestto
clear up at the outset a misconception based upon a misnomer: the moral right
doctrine is not concerned with rights whose enforceability is a matter of moral
suasion divorced from legal sanction. The moral rights of an author are legal
rights, and enforceable as such.' 22 Such statements have gone unnoticed, and
tionsto both. 21 CHARLESALANWRIGHr&KNNETHW.GRAHAMJL,FEDERALPRAClcI-EAND
PROCEDURE: FEDERALRUIEsOFEVIDENCE§ 5054,at 134,137 n.30 (2000 Supp.). Anothertext
referring to Ball's work, however, cites only to the disapproved version. See 29 AM. JUR.2D
EVIDENCE § 311, at 326 n.78 (1994). The reader is encouraged to compare the two versions of
the article in order to individually determine whether Professor Ball's reaction was warranted.
I thank Professor Edward H. Hunvald, Jr. for bringing the Ball articles to my attention.
117. E.g., MERRYMAN & ElSEN, supra note 28, at 142; Cotter, supra note 15, at 10 n.40;
Diamond, supra note 32, at 244; Halpern, supra note 25, at 65 n.3; Kwall, Copyright and the
MoralRight, supra note 17, at 3 n.6; Netanel, supra note 29, at 383.
118. GRAND DICTIONNAME 295 (1993); CASSELL'S DICTIONARY271 (1981).
119. GRAND DICTIONNAIRE, supra note 118, at 583; CASSEIL's DICTIONARY, supra note
118, at 496. Surprisingly, the term droit moral does not appear in any of the leading French or
French-English dictionaries.
120. GRAND DICTIONNARE, supra note 118, at 583; CASSEIL'S DICTIONARY, supra note
118, at 496. These definitions were also contained in the dictionaries of the early twentieth
century. See, e.g., A FENCH AND ENGLISH DICTIONARY 432 (1902) (defining moral as "moral
nature, mind"; "morally, mentally").
121. Arthur S. Katz made a passionate plea for the formalincorporation of the moral rights
doctrine into American law. Katz, supra note 15, at 375 ("Proposed: That the doctrine of
Moral Right be formally incorporated into American copyright law."). As to why American
courts had not yet accepted moral rights, Katz offered "ignorance," id. at 410, "judicial abdica-
tion most foul," id. at 412, and "inept[ ] handl[ing] by so much of the Anglo-American Bench
and Bar,' id. at 376. He asked: "Is it too much to ask that the author's right of personality be
formally recognized and protected by the courts of the United States?" Id. at 427.
122. Katz, supra note 15, at 390; see also 1 LADAS, supra note 63, § 272, at 575 (stating
that term is "incorrect because it implies that it is not a legal right enforceable by legal reme-
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the American "moral rights" term has become "firmly entrenched"'" from its
earliest use'24 (in part because of the lack of other names or the refusal to
adopt them).125
dies"); Kwall, Copyight and the Moral Right, supra note 17, at 3, n.6 (stating that droit moral
"also encompasses a right that exists in an entity's ultimate being"). Nevertheless, a small
chorus of speakers in the moral rights dialogue maintain that moral rights does or should include
amoral dimension. See WORLD INTEL ALPRoP. ORO., GUIDETOTHEBERNE CONVEION
FORTHEPROTECTIONOFLTrERARYANDARTISTICWORKS 41,42 (1978) (explaining that article
6bis "underlines that, in addition to pecuniary or economic benefits, copyright also includes
rights of a moral kind. These stem from the fact that the work is a reflection of the personality
of its creator, just as the economic rights reflect the author's need to keep body and soul
together"; article 6bis "stops entrepreneurs from turning the moral right into an immoral one");
Amamick, supra note 15, at 35 (referring to "spiritual or moral interest in instilling respect
within the public for the creative process and its products"); Sarraute, supra note 25, at 465
(stating that "the 'moral' right... includes non-property attributes of an intellectual and moral
character").
123. Diamond, supra note 32, at 244.
124. The case law indicates that amongAmerican authors, the term "moral rights" was used
as early as 1940. See Harris v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 35 F. Supp. 153, 155
(S.D.N.Y. 1940) (stating that under contract between parties, plaintiff "divested herself of all
rights generally known as the moral rights of authors").
125. In one of the early articles on the subject, Roeder wrote, "it is difficult to find any
other expression which would do as well without being unwieldy." Roeder, supra note 25, at
554-55. As early as 1938, a treatise author urged that a more appropriate term would be "the
right of author's personality," from the German Urheberpersanlichkeitsrecht. 1 LADAS, supra
note 63, § 272, at 575 n.2. More similar to the German term than the French is the Korean in-
gyuk-kwon, whose three characters are derived from Chinese characters that mean roughly,
"person," "human" or "man" (in), "rule" or "form" (gvuk), and "right" or "authority" (kwon).
BRuc K. GRANT, A GUIDE TO KOREAN CHARACTERS 28, 160,326 (2d rev. ed. 1982). Over
the years, several commentators have repeated Ladas's observation, and others have called for
the replacement of "moral rights" with "personality right." E.g., Kwall, Copyright and the
Moral Right, supra note 17, at 3 n.6; Merryman, supra note 25, at 1025; Netanel, supra note
29, at 383; Stevenson, supra note 38, at 90; see also Beyer, supra note 25, at 1023 (stating that
moral rights are "ordinarily described as 'rights of personality'"). Indeed, one commentator
proposed the use of "personal right" over "moral rights" "since it more accurately translates
droit moral than does 'moral rights,' and it is more suggestive of the theoretical basis that
underlies the concept." Damich, The Right ofPersonalty, supra note 22, at 6. Not many have
adopted the suggestion. On the lighter side (presumably), one commentator muses about the
great activity over the terminology-
In the United States... the need to argue against so lofty an appellation as 'moral
rights' has always troubled critics of the doctrine and put them on the defensive.
Thus they frequently suggest adoption of less charged labels as the subject of the
debate. 'Personal rights' and 'non-economic rights' are some of the less imagina-
tive substitutes. More recently my colleague Professor Robert Gorman informally
coined the phrase 'aesthetic veto' as a substitute for 'moral rights'. Somewhatmore
combative, and in the heat of advocacy rather than the perhaps more amicable and
scholarly confines of this hall, I have suggested replacing the term droit moral with
the term droit caprice.
Baumgarten, supra note 93, at 87.
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At best, the partial translation of the French term has led to hardened
views among some over the meaning of moral rights; the literature indicates
far too much judging of the book of moral rights by its cover, and authors
have paid the price.12 6 The mention of "moral rights" suggests to too many
judges, commentators, and interested observers, the legal enforcement of some
moral value. One judge wrote in 1952 that "'moral rights' seems to indicate
to some persons something not legal, something meta-legal"; indeed, the very
phrase might have "frightened" American courts.127 Even VARA, universally
regarded as the first federal moral rights statute, avoids the phrase "moral
rights," preferring instead "rights of certain authors to attribution and integ-
rity."1 Popular discussion on the subject of authors' moral rights still in-
dicates a misunderstanding and confusion of moral rights.'
D. Summary: U.S. Moral Rights
A summary of the above discussion is in order. Despite various pro-
posals for reform and elaboration, 3' the moral rights of authors in the United
126. Indeed, the doctrine might well have been better received in the United States with
reference to personality as opposed to morality. See Diamond, supra note 32, at 244.
127. Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 590 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J., concurring); see
Damich, The Right of Personality, supra note 22, at 6 n.16 (noting that judicial reluctance to
accept droit moral is "a negative reaction to the term 'moral,' which has seemed to invite the
application of 'ethical' as against 'legal considerations.'") (quoting JOHN M. KERNOCaAN,
CASES AND MATmRALs ON BUSNE5SS TORTS, Installment IV, 104 (1983)).
128. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(1994).
129. The confusion and misunderstanding was most obvious in the debate over the colon-
zation of black and white movies, when movie directors opposing colorization urged that movie
studios had the legal, but not moral, right to colorize the films they owned. David Blum, Ted
Turner's Effort to Put Some Color in Bogart's Cheeks, MINN.-ST. PAUL STAR-TRIB., Jan. 29,
1987, at 17A, available at 1987 WL 4938833. That led to the following observation by one
observer: "[T]he argument made against colorization is that just because you have the legal
right to do something doesn't mean you have the moral right. So why are movie directors above
moral law, while [Ted] Turner is not?" Id.
Then there is the case of the law graduate who sued his law alma mater and its law journal
(of which he was a member), alleging that the journal's editors had "mangled" his law review
comment Choe v. Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law, 920 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff'd, 81
F.3d 319 (2d Cir. 1996). The case prompted one observer, a practitioner and law lecturer, to
declare that "there is simply no such thing as a federal claim for violations of one's moral rights."
Richard Grossman, Understandably, FewReadLaw Reviews, THE SYRACUSEPOST-STANDARD,
Aug. 14, 1995, atA6, available at 1995 WL 3742783. Making clear that the writer's under-
standing of "moral rights" had little to do with an author's personal rights, he added that if the
plaintiff were "really astute, he would have known that all human beings waive whatever moral
rights they have the moment they enter law school." Id. For good measure, he dismissed
Choe's action as an "obscene waste of a court's time." Id.
130. See Stevenson, supra note 38, at 116-17 (proposing amendment to Copyright Act).
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States appear settled in a legal thicket - federal legislation that is applicable
to a limited number of artists and situations,' a patchwork of state statutes'32
(on which the preemptive effect of federal legislation is still in question),'
and a melange"3 4 of common law theories emanating from a "collage of
judicial attempts' 135 to define American moral rights. 136 Courts have followed
"a tortuous path," to find some accommodation "between traditional property
and copyright concepts and creative sensibilities."'137 Moreover, the American
moral rights movement has as its worst enemy its own name, which further
discourages understanding of the personal interests of the creative process.
Most importantly, the integrity right specifically and moral rights generally
suffer from a lack of a consistent theme, an underlying purpose, a construct,
and a configuration.' 8 As Professor Lawrence Adam Beyer wrote, "Unless
and until moral rights doctrine is developed into a determinative, coherent,
and compelling body of principles, 'the moral right of integrity' will serve
only as a stirring rhetorical wrapper for an expandable bundle of basically
unnecessary and unjustified interest group preferences."' 39
As elaborated on in the next part, this Article proposes that the author's
moral rights (chiefly, the right of integrity) be designated more simply as the
author's right of dignity. Perhaps a new designation, under a new rationale,
will merit further consideration or at least encourage further discussion in the
search for a meaningful moral rights plan suited to American interests. The
purpose here is to adopt an American right of integrity consistent with the
American socio-legal culture, ratherthantotransplantthe Frenchdroit moral.4o
131. 17tU.S.C. § 106A(1994).
132. H.R REP. No. 101-514, at 9 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 6802, 6919
(testimony ofJohn Koegel, Esq.).
133. For a full discussion of the preemption question, see Kwall, How Fine Art Fares Post
VARA, supra note 25, at 29-45. One commentator subscribes to the view that VARA largely
pre-empts the state statutes. Netanel, supra note 29, at 351 n.9, 393.
134. Amarnicksupra note 15, at 61.
135. Halpern, supra note 25, at 78.
136. Legal claims asserted from this thicket have yielded scattered results. Professor Cotter
posits that current moral rights protections in American law is "close to the optimal system for
this country at this time," because "a more vigorous system poses substantial risks to the well-
being of both artists and audiences." Cotter, supra note 15, at 6.
137. Halpern, supra note 25, at 78.
138. Professor Halpern notes that in light of the limitations of VARA, "[i]t may well be
that... we should move to a totally separate moral right cofiguration .... We need to
question our underlying assumptions both to find and to form the consensus from which mean-
ingful moral right recognition can emerge." Halpern, supra note 25, at 88.
139. Beyer, supra note 25, at 1111.
140. For a discussion of the development of moral rights protections in common law
countries whose culture is similar to that of the United States, see Gerald Dworkin, The Moral
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If it is true that the body of moral rights is culturally dependent'4' and moral
rights protections differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, then this Article
proposes a right of integrity that can be established in light of the American
cultural fabric.
Iff. Toward Dignity-Based Moral Rights
A. What Dignity?
This Article proposes an American understanding of moral rights based
on the author's right of dignity. Initially then, it is important to discuss what
dignity means because the term has multiple meanings in common usage142 and
is often used without precise definition. 43 Perhaps by default, or because of
the lack of any more informed source, the dictionary is a proper beginning
Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Common Law Countries, 19 COLUNL-VLA JL. &
ARTs 229 (1995). With regard to transplantation of rules, "International experience with the
[European] transplantation, as distinguished from the adaptation, of legal institutions has not
been encouraging. We can learn from the [continental] experience, but we must develop our
own method of employing its lessons." Meryman, supra note 25, at 1043. For a discussion
of the issues seen in the transplantation of copyright rules in the international setting, see Paul
Edward Geller, Legal Transplants in International Copyright: Some Problems ofMethod, 13
UCLA PAc. BAsNL.J. 199 (1994).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 106-10.
142. Because the dignity-based rationale for moral rights takes into account the individual
dignity of the author, dignity here refers to personal or human dignity.
143. See Charles Robert Tremper, Respect for the Human Dignity of Minors: What the
Constitution Requires, 39 SYRACUsE L. REV. 1293,1294 n.6 (1988) (noting "amorphous mul-
tiple meanings of the word in common usage"). There are several contexts in which the term can
be used with regard to an American legal proceeding. A court is an institution of dignity. Indeed
the physical courtroom can "add[ ] to the atmosphere of dignity and authority." William H.
Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: 'The First Hundred Years Were the Hardest," 42 U. MIAM L.
REV. 475, 475 (1988). Ajudge may be complimented for lending to the proceedings an "aura
of dignity." Laura Asseo, Rehnquist Prefers to Keep Things Moving - Chief Justice Remains
Mum about His Views, STAR-LEDGE (Newark, NJ), Feb. 10,1999, at 9, available at 1999 WL
100315852 (quoting Rep. Henry Hyde). During the course of a trial and hearings, judges are
empowered to take action necessary to vindicate the court's dignity. Pounders v. Watson, 521
U.S. 982,988 (1997); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517,534 (1925).
Note the contexts in which candidate George W. Bush used the term "dignity" in his
acceptance speech before the Republican National Convention: "[W]e will extend the promise
of prosperity to every forgotten comer of this country. . . . to every family, a chance to live
with dignity and hope"; "our new economy must never forget the old, unfinished struggle for
human dignity"; "[wle will transform today's housing rental program to help hundreds of
thousands of low-income families find stability and dignity in a home of their own"; "I will
swear to uphold the honor and dignity of the office to which I have been elected." Bush Out-
lines His Goals: 'I Want to Change the Tone of Washington, 'N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 4,2000, atA24
(emphasis added). Democratic candidate Al Gore did not refer to dignity in his acceptance
speech.
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point." The primary definition of "dignity" in Webster's is "the quality or
state of being worthy[;] intrinsic worth." '145 Webster's uses as an example the
reference in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that
"[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights."1" Indeed,
it is in the international setting147 and often in the materials issued by the
United Nations that the term appears with some regularity.1" The preamble to
144. The dictionary is, of course, "not the source definitively to resolve legal questions."
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 n.9 (1986). Although it may be "the last resort
of the baffled," Jordan v. Do George, 341 U.S. 223, 234 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting), here, it
is an early reference. For a revealing examination of the Supreme Court's use of dictionaries in
its work, see Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Ledcon HasBecome a Fortress:
The United States Supreme Court's Use ofDictionaries, 47 BuiF. L. REV. 227 (1999).
145. WEBsTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGIisHLANGUAGE
UNAHBEIG 632 (3d ed. 1993). The primary definition also includes "excellence," which it
offers as a synonym. 1d The full definition is as follows:
[1] the quality or state of being worthy. intrinsic worth: EXCELLENCE <the [] of
this act was worth the audience of kings - Shak> <all human beings are born free
and equal in [ ] and rights - U.N. Declaration ofHuman Rights> [2] the quality or
state of being honored or esteemed: degree of esteem: HONOR... [3a] high rank,
office or position [b] archaic: RANK, DEGREE [c] a particular office, rank, or title
of honor... [d] Eng law: a title of honor that is an incorporeal hereditament or real
property [4] archaic [a]: one holding high rank. DIGNITARY... [b] persons of
high rank as a body [5] formal reserve of manner, appearance of manner, appear-
ance, behavior, or language; behavior that accords with self-respect or with regard
for the seriousness ofthe occasion or purpose: GRAVITY, POISE....
Id. Note the definitions of dignity under Black's, which do not refer to individual worth as
discussed herein:
1. The state of being noble; the state of being dignified. 2. An elevated title or
position. 3. A person holding an elevated title; a dignitary. 4. A right to hold a
title of nobility, which may be hereditary or for life.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 468 (7th ed. 1999). Nor do the Scriptural references to dignity
appear to relate to individual worth. See Genesis 49:3 (King James) ("Reuben, thou art my
firstborn, my might, and the beginning of my strength, the excellency of dignity, and the
excellency of power"); Esther 6:3 (King James) ("And the king said, What honour and dignity
hath been done to Mordecai for this? Then said the king's servants that ministered unto him,
There is nothing done for him."); Ecclesiastes 10:6 (King James) ("Folly is set in great dignity,
and the rich sit in low place."); Habakkuk 1:7 (King James) ("They are terrible and dreadful:
their judgment and their dignity shall proceed of themselves.").
146. WEBsTER's, supra note 145,at632 (quoting UniversalDeclaration ofHumanRights,
GA Res. 217 I(A), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948)).
147. For an insightful discussion on intellectual property rights as international human
rights, see Rosemary J, Coombe, Intellectual Property, Human Rights & Sovereignty: New
Dilemmas in International Law Posed by the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and the
Conversation ofBiodiversity, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 59 (1998).
148. UniversalDeclaration ofHuman Rights, GA Res. 217 I(A), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
at 71, U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights]; U.N.
CHARTER pmbl. ("inherent dignity and worth").
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the original U.N. Charter, promulgated in 1945, included an affirmation ofthe
"inherent dignity and worth of the human person."1 49 Two decades later, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognized
"the inherent dignity... of all members of the human family.' 50 Finally, the
United Nations Declaration of Common Values, issued at the conclusion ofthe
Global Millennium Summit"'5 declared, "[W]e have a collective responsibility
to uphold the principle[ I of human dignity."'5 2 But none of these materials
attempt to define "dignity" in any meaningful way.'53 The voluminous com-
mentary on dignity notes the difficulty, perhaps futility, in defining the term. 5
4
One observer asks whether defining dignity as intrinsic human worth is any
more illuminating because it does not explain what dignity is, as it simply re-
names it.' Another points out that if dignity means worth, then the various
references to "dignity and worth" inthe literature pose a redundancy, unless the
two terms are synonymous and one is not a definition for the other."56 Adding
149. U.N. CHARTEI pmbl.; see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note
148, pmbl. (referring to "the inherent dignity and... the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family" and "the dignity and worth of the human person"). A 1987
resolution by the United Nations General Assembly included guidelines to develop "interna-
tional instruments in the field of human rights," which should "[ble of fundamental character
and derive from the inherent dignity and worth of the human person." GA. Res. 41/120, U.N.
GAOR Supp. No. 53,3 at 178-79, U.N. Doe. A/41/53 (1987).
150. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA Res. 2200
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doe. A16316 preamble (1966).
151. For a report of the summit by the popular press, see Barbara Crossette, Summit in New
York: The Overview; U.N. Meeting Ends with Declaration of Common Values, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 9,2000, atAl.
152. United Nations Declaration of Common Values, Declaration 1.2, reprinted in Text of
the Declaration, N.Y. TIMES, Sept 9,2000, atA4 [hereinafter Declaration of Common Values];
see also id. Declaration L6 ("Men and women have the right to live their lives and raise their
children in dignity, free from hunger and from the fear of violence, oppression or injustice.");
Declaration VL26 ("We resolve to... help all refugees and displaced persons to return volun-
tarily to their homes, in safety and dignity, and to be smoothly reintegrated into their societies.").
153. Professor Louis Henkin points out that perhaps the authors of the UniversalDeclara-
tion of Human Rights thought a definition unnecessary. Louis Henkin, Human Dignity and
Constitutional Rights, in THE CoNsTIT oN OF RIGHTS: HuMAN DIGNry AND AM cRICAN
VALUES 210,211 (Michael J. Meyer & William A- Parent eds., 1992) [hereinafter CONSTrru-
TION OF RIGHTS].
154. See William A. Parent, Constitutional Values andHuman Dignity, in CONSTITUTION
OF RIGHrS, supra note 153, at 52 (noting that without "a convincing account" of obscure terms
to define dignity, "we are left with high-sounding but vacuous explanations"); Oscar Schachter,
Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 848, 849 (1983) ("In some situa-
tions an abstract definition is not needed; but it is not entirely satisfying to accept the idea that
human dignity cannot be defined or analyzed in general terms.").
155. Parent, supra note 154, at 47, 52.
156. Schachter, supra note 154, at 849.
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to the difficulty of a clear definition of dignity is the frequency with which the
term is presented in conjunction with apparently related terms - equality,"s
autonomy,158 personality,1 59 personhood, 160 identity,161 sef- 16 2 self
expression,"r the right to be let alone,"6 and quite frequently, privacy. 65 Such
discussion raises the question of whether dignity overlaps with the other terms,
whether it is a subset of one or more (or vice versa), 66 or whether definitions
157. Declaration of Common Values, supra note 152, 1.2 ("[WIe have a collective respon-
sibility to uphold the principles of human dignity, equality and equity at the global level.").
Some state constitutions refer to "dignity" but apparently mean "equality." For example, the
Louisiana Constitution provides for a "Right to Individual Dignity." LA. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
The text of this provision, however, sounds of equal protection:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall discrimi-
nate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations. No
law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person
because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affilia-
tions. Slavery and involuntary servitude are prohibited, except in the latter case as
punishment for crime.
Id. Likewise, the Montana Constitution provision on individual dignity states: "The dignity
of the human being is inviolable. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws."
MONTANA CONST. art. Il, § 4.
158. Hugo Adam Bedau, TheEighth Amendment Human Dignity, and the Death Penalty,
in CONSTITTnON OFRIGTS, supra note 153, at 145; R. Kent Grcenawalt, The Right to Silence
and Human Dignity, in CONSnTtJON OF RIGHrS, supra note 153, at 192-93.
159. E.g.,Henkin,supra note 153, at211.
160. E.g., Christina E. Wells & Erin Elliott Motley, Reinforcing the Myth of the Crazed
Rapist: A Feminist Critique ofRecent Rape Legislation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 127, 193 (2001).
161. See Jonathan Kahn, BringingDignityBackto Light: PublicityRights and the Eclipse
of the Tort ofAppropriation ofldentity, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 213, 214 (1999).
162. E.g.,Henkin, supra note 153, at211.
163. E.g., Kenneth L. Karat, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82
CoP.NELL L. REv. 523, 538 (1997); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social
Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725,736,762 (1998);
Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment,
77 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1809 (1999); Steven Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal
Scholarship, 30 UCLAL. REV. 1103,1197-98 (1983); Burt NeubomeBluesfor the Left Hand:
A Critique ofCass Sunstein's Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech, 62 U. C-L L. REV.
423, 441-42 (1995) (book review).
164. See Edward J. Bloustein, Group Privacy: The Right to Huddle, 8 RUTGERS-CAM. L.J.
219, 278 (1977); Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, Note, "Special Needs" and the Fourth Amendment: An
Exception Poised to Swallow the Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529,
533 (1997).
165. See generally Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An
Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964); see also Greenawalt, supra note 158,
at 193; Buffaloe, supra note 164, at 533.
166. Indeed, in the United Nations Declaration of Common Values, dignity appears under
the heading of "freedom," which is described as one of six "fundamental values": "Freedom.
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of dignity and the other terms are mutually exclusive to the extent that they are
not identical.
It was within one discussion of privacy in which the matter of dignity
was raised, which sets the stage for this Article's discussion of the dignity-
based moral rights of authors. Some background is necessary. In The Right
to Privacy," a highly influential law review article, Samuel D. Warren and
Louis D. Brandeis argued for the formal recognition of the right."r Years
later, Professor Edward J. Bloustein elaborated on Warren and Brandeis's dis-
cussion in his Privacy As an Aspect of Human Dignity.es Though neither
Warren and Brandeis nor Bloustein referred to moral rights ofthe author, their
wide-ranging discussions in advancing an actionable right of privacy included
mention of the works of authors." ° For instance, in drawing a parallel be-
tween the right to be let alone and the protection given to artistic or literary
expressions, Warren and Brandeis wrote, "The principle which protects per-
sonal writings and all other personal productions, not against theft and physi-
cal appropriation, but against publication in any form, is in reality not the
principle of private property, but that of an inviolate personality."' Seizing
on this language, Bloustein explained that "inviolate personality" means 'The
individual's independence, dignity and integrity, 172 which "defines man's
essence as a unique and self-determining being." '173 He wrote, "It is because
our Western ethico-religious tradition posits such dignity and independence
Men and women have the right to live their lives and rai their children in dignity, free from
hunger and from the fear of violence, oppression or injustice." Declaration of Common Values,
supra note 152, Declaration 1.6. The other five fundamental values are equality, solidarity,
tolerance, respect for nature, and shared responsibility. Id.
167. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAlV. L. RLrv. 193
(1890).
168. Judge Alex Kozinski described The Right to Privacy as "perhaps the most influential
law review article ever published." Alex Kozinski, Who Gives a Hoot About Legal Scholar-
ship?, 37 Hous. L. REv. 295, 311 (2000); see also Jane E. Kirtley, Privacy and the Press in the
New Millennium: How International StandardsAre Driving the Privacy Debate in the United
States andAbroad, 23 U. ARK. Lrr ROCK L. REV. 69, 70 (2000) ("[W'ith one law review
article, this pair of Boston lawyers lit the slow fuse on a time bomb that took about 100 years
to explode. When it did, the impact was felt around the world.").
169. Bloustein, supra note 165. Bloustein's article did not intend to examine the contours
of the dignity right, but was a response to a piece by William L. Prosser, in which Prosser
rejected the notion of privacy as a single tort, but rather claimed it to be a "complex of four."
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. Rnv. 383, 389 (1960). Bloustein disagreed, preferring
the single versus the four-part approach. Bloustein, supra note 165, at 1000.
170. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 167, at 198-204; Bloustein, supra note 164, at 968-
71.
171. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 167, at 205 (emphasis added).
172. Bloustein, supra note 165, at 971.
173. Id.
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of will in the individual that the common law secures to a man 'literary and
artistic property' - the right to determine 'to what extent his thoughts, senti-
ments, emotions shall be communicated to others.' 174 Warren's and Bran-
deis's notion of privacy would protect what is tantamount to the author's dis-
closure right: "[Mhe individual is entitled to decide whether that which is his
shall be given to the public. No other has the right to publish his productions
in any form, without his consent.""' Bloustein elaborated that it would be
"inconsistent with a belief in man's individual dignity and worth to refuse him
the right to determine whether his artistic and literary efforts should be
published to the world."
176
Warren's and Brandeis's references to the protection of personal writings
and productions against publication "in any form" and the governing principle
of "inviolate personality" '177 should resonate for advocates of authors' rights.
With regard to the former phrase, "publication in any form" emphasizes the
author's right of disclosure, whereas publication "in any form" relates to the
right of integrity. In addition, Warren's and Brandeis's "inviolate personal-
ity," together with Bloustein's complementary references to individual unique-
ness, independence, and self-determination, ring of the author's personality
interest. With this backdrop, the following query is posed: if privacy would
protect the author's right of disclosure (as referenced in The Right to Privacy),
and if privacy can be regarded as a subset of human dignity,"'8 then could the
174. Id. (quoting Warren & Brandeis, supra note 167, at 198).
175. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 167, at 199 (footnote omitted). "This right is wholly
independent of the material on which, or the means by which, the thought, sentiment, or emo-
tion is expressed." Id.
176. Bloustein, supra note 165, at 971. "He would be less of a man, less of a master over
his own destiny, were he without this right" Id. Warren and Brandeis stated that this right "is
lost as soon as there is a publication." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 167, at 200. They noted
that the "right is lost only when the author himself communicates his production to the public, -
in other words, publishes it," id. at 199-200, thus indicating that privacy could not be expanded
to include what students of copyright know as the right of integrity. The applicability of Warren
and Brandeis's views on authors' moral rights is also noted in Hughes, The Philosophy of
Intellectual Property, supra note 22, at 355-56.
177. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 167, at 205 (emphasis added).
178. The view that privacy is a subset ofthe broader dignity has support from the commen-
tators. See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 161, at 219 ("[Where dignity broadly implicates a consider-
ation of the inherent value of human beings, a respect for their personhood, as it were, privacy
involves the more focused rights to protect the conditions necessary to individuation."); see also
Harry Kalven, Jr.,Privacy in TortLaw- Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, LAw & CoNM.
PROBs. 326, 326 (1966) ("privacy is surely deeply linked to individual dignity and the needs
of human existence."). But see (ary T. Schwarlz, Explaining and Justifring a Limited Tort of
False Light Invasion of Privacy, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 885, 897 (1991) (describing as
"unsatisfactory" Bloustein's characterization of privacy as a subcategory of dignity. "Human
dignity can be called into question by a wide variety of practices in society that have nothing
to do with privacy and for which the law makes no effort to provide a remedy.").
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broader dignity interest of an author provide for a right of integrity subsequent
to disclosure (as inferred in Privacy As an Aspect of Human Dignity)? The
enticing question presents a logical launching point for a dignity-based moral
rights system, one that would emphasize the right of integrity, but also include
the right of disclosure, and perhaps more remotely, the right of attribution."
Of course, hasty optimism should not prevail at the expense of delibera-
tion. A legal recognition of dignity first requires the ability to ascertain the
core elements and outer dimensions of what has been traditionally described
as a value (in contrast to a right), which is a difficulttask, as discussed above.
Indeed, commentators have been critical of Bloustein's reliance on the dignity
concept. One observed that "although human dignity is an important value,
it is hard to define, identify, and measure."'go Yet another commentator cred-
ited Bloustein with "passionately affirming the importance of [a] moral princi-
ple," but declared that "the judicial system lacks the capability effectively to
protect the interest. The law is probably not the appropriate vehicle for the
furtherance of the 'inviolate personality.""'
Thus, the initial step toward a dignity-based moral right of authors is to
identify the proper dimensions of a legal dignity. This task accomplished, the
second step is to fashion the specific protections that an authorial dignity right
would encompass. This discussion follows.
B. American Dignity
Commentators, especially those espousing a formal American right of
dignity, have noted the implicit presence of individual dignity in the Declara-
179. The right of attribution could be seen as a means to protect one's identity, and the
right of identity as a form of a dignity interest.
180. Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiemfor a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren andlBran-
deis'sPrivacy Tort, 68 CORNLL L. REV. 291,339 (1983). But Bloustein had already addressed
this concern:
The words we use to identify and describe basic human values are necessarily vague
and ill-defined. Compounded of profound human hopes and longings on the one
side and elusive aspects of human psychology and experience on the other, our
social goals are more fit to be pronounced by prophets and poets than by professors.
We are fortunate, then, that some of our judges enjoy a touch of the prophet's
vision and the poet's tongue.
Bloustein, supra note 165, at 1001. Nevertheless, Bloustein's many references to "dignity" are
in conjunction with other terms, indicating his own understanding of the related nature of
dignity and other values, and perhaps the difficulty in definition: dignity and personality, id.
at 974, 991, 994, 995; dignity and individuality, id. at 973, 974, 982, 984, 991, 1003; dignity
and freedom, id. at 973, 1000; dignity and pride, id. at 984; dignity and independence, id. at
971; dignity and worth, id. at 971; dignity and integrity, id. at 971,982.
181. Sheldon W. Halpem, Rethinking the Right of Privacy: Dignit, Decency, and the
Law's Limitations, 43 RUTGERS L. R~rv. 539, 563 (1991).
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tion of Independence" and are quick to point out the explicit references to the
term in the Federalist Papers. i Yet unlike the national constitutions of some
countries,'84 the United States Constitution does not provide for the right of
dignity. Nevertheless, some commentators have urged that dignity is constitu-
tionally inspired.ss The late Justice William Brennan was perhaps the most
prominent and vocal advocate of this view, arguing that human dignity is a
value that the Constitution affimns.186 Other commentators have argued that,
182. See Bernard R. Boxill,Digniy, Slavery, and the ThirteenthAmendmen4 in CoNsTIu-
1ION OF RIGHTS, supra note 153, at 102,105; Henkin, supra note 153, at 213. Both Boxill and
Henkin rely on the oft-quoted text, 'We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights...." THE
DECLARATION OF Imn)EmmNCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
183. E.g., Parent, supra note 154, at 69-70 & nn.65-66.
184. English translations of various national constitutions indicate that several countries
provide for a right of dignity in some form. See, e.g., ALG. CONST. pt. 1, ch. IV, art. 34(1)-(2),
available at International ConstitutionalLawAlgeria, http'/Avww.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/ag
00000 .html ("The State guarantees the inviolability of the human entity. Any... breach of
dignity is forbidden."); CAMBODIA CONST. ch. II, art. 38(2), available at International Con-
stitutional Law, Cambodia, http'lwww.uni-wuerzburg.de/aw/cbOOOOO_.html ("The law pro-
tects the life, honor, and dignity of the citizens."); F.R.G. CoNST. ch. , art. 1(1), available at
International Constitutional Law, Germany, http'//www.uni-wurzburglaw/gmOOOOO_.html
("Human dignity is inviolable. To respect and protect it is the duty of all state authority.");
GREECE CONST. pt I, § 1, art. 2(1), available at International Constitutional Law, Greece,
http'//www.uni-wuerzburgAaw/grOOOOO.html ("Respect for and protection of human dignity
constitute the primary obligation of the State "); PARA. CONST. ch. I, art. 33(2), available at
International Constitutional Law, Paraguay, http:/www.uni-wuezburglaw/paOOOOO_.html
("The protection of the privacy, dignity, and private image of each individual is hereby guaran-
teed."); Russ. CONsT. pt. I, ch. 2, art. 21(1), available at International Constitutional Law,
Russia, http'//www.uni-wuerzburgJlaw/rs00000_.html ("The dignity of the person is protected
by the state."); SWED. CONST. ch. 1, art. 2(1), available at International Constitutional Law,
Sweden, h+.tp'/www.uni-wuerzburglaw/swOOOOO_.html ("Public power shall be exercised...
for the freedom and dignity of the individual."); YuGo. CONST. § II, art. 22(2), available at
International Constitutional Law, Yugoslavia, http'/Avww.uni-wuerzburgIlaw/srO0000_.html
("The personal dignity and security of the individuals shall be guaranteed."). English transla-
tions of more than 80 countries' constitutions are available at International ConstitutionalLaw,
at http "/www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/.
For a comparison of the American view of dignity with that of other jurisdictions in the
international community, see Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in
German andAmerican ConstitutionalLaw, 1997 UTAHL. REV. 963 (1997).
185. E.g., G. P. Fletcher, Human DigniV as a Constitutional Value, 221U. W. ONT. L.REV.
171 (1984); Parent, supra note 154.
186. See Michael J. Meyer, Introduction, in CONSTr=ON OF RIGHTS, supra note 153,
183, at 1 & n.1 (citing In Search of the Constitution: Mr. Justice Brennan (PBS broadcast,
1987); In Search of the Constitution: Ronald Dworkin: The ChangingStory (PBS broadcast,
1987)) (alluding to Justice Brennan and Professor Ronald Dworkin's emphasis that "the funda-
mental value affirmed by the Constitution ... was the value of human dignity"). Cf William
J. Brennsn, Jr., The Essential Dignity of Man (remarks to Morrow Citizens Association on
Correction, Nov. 21, 1961, Newark, New Jersey) (copy on file with author).
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like privacy, the right of dignity ought to be a Constitutional right.' Yet the
case for judicial recognition of dignity as a findamental right is still, at best,
in its early stage.'88 The various references to individual and personal dignity
by the Supreme Court-do not rise to a formal recognition of the right.
89
Individual litigants who have asserted dignity as a constitutionally protected
right have been turned away."
Perhaps realizing the judicial reluctance or wariness to recognize a dig-
nity right, Professor Bedau wrote aptly, "If human dignity is to be protected
and advanced, it must be by congressional legislation, or by the sovereign
states, or by private persons and their organizations - but not by the federal
courts claiming to interpret our constitutional aw."19' Notwithstanding the
commentators' doubts as to dignity's ascertainable meaning, private organiza-
tions have formally demanded dignity for their members, 92 and Congress,
187. See Parent, supra note 154, at 69-70 (arguing that human dignity enjoys implicit con-
stitutional protection in First, Fifth, Sixth, Eight, Thirteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amend-
ments and that references to dignity in Federalist Papers indicate purpose to advance dignity
in Constitution); see also Tremper, supra note 143, at 1296 (urging that "the concept of human
dignity pervades the Constitution and has clear implications for constitutional adjudication");
id. at 1297 n.20 (citing authorities that share view that "'[tihe basic value in the United States
Constitution, broadly conceived, has become a concern for human dignity'").
188. See generallv Jordan J. Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A Juris-
prudentially Based Inquiry into Criteria and Content, 27 How. L. J. 145 (1984) (surveying
Supreme Court's references to "dignity" in opinions and noting increased frequency and
changed meaning); Stephen J. Wermiel, Law and Human Dignity: The Judicial Soul ofJustice
Brennan, 7 WM & MARY BILL RTS. J. 223 (1998) (discussing Justice Brennan's concept of
human dignity and his increasing references to dignity in later opinions).
189. For a compilation of the Justices' references to personal dignity in case opinions, see
Paust, supra note 188, at nn.35-55; Wermielsupra note 188, at 224 & n.7. ProfessorWermiel
catalogues the first references to individual dignity by the Supreme Court Id. at 226 (quoting
Chisholm v. Georgia., 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 455 (1793) ("A State; useful and valuable as the
contrivance is, is the inferior contrivance of man; and from his native dignity derives all its
acquired importance."); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 632 (1896) (noting "sentiment of
personal self-respect, liberty, independence and dignity which has inhabited the breasts of
English speaking peoples for centuries") (Field, J., dissenting)).
190. E.g., Hutchinson v. Lausell, 672 F. Supp. 43,45 (D.P.R. 1987) ("[P]laintiff claims
that... his dignity has been damaged. The Constitution of the United States, however, does
not contain such bald protection[ ]."). One court has declined to recognize a claim for a breach
of the right of dignity. Afentakis v. Mem'l Hosp., 667 N.Y.S.2d 602,604 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1997).
191. Bedau, supra note 158, at 146.
192. Often such organizations have "dignity" in their name - Dignity/USA and Death with
Dignity National Center, for example. Dignity/USA is a national organization (with various
local chapters) comprised of gay, lesbian, and transgendered Catholics, that claims an "inherent
dignity" and seeks to reinforce and affirm their "sense of self acceptance and dignity." Dig-
nity/SA, Statement of Position & Purpose, available at http'//www.dignityusa.orgfpurpose.
html> (last visited Oct. 13, 2001). See Murray Dubin, In Conflict with Faith, PHIA. INQUIRER,
Aug. 29, 2000, atD1 (reporting Dignity/USA's history and activity), available atLEXIS,News
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federal agencies, and the states have included numerous references to dignity
in their laws. The frequent mention of dignity in Congressional enactments"9
affirms that certain classes of persons are entitled to dignity - most frequently,
victims of crime,194 the elderly, 95 those with disabilities or special needs,""
and those without means - the homeless'" and the unemployed.1se Similar
Aug. 29,2000, atDl (reporting Dignity/USA's history and activity), available atLEXIS, News
Library, PHI File; Death with Dignity National Center, How You Can Get Involved, available
at httpJAvww.deathwithdignity.org/mvolvedlmvolvedhome.htm (ast visited Oct. 13, 2001)
("There is an urgent need to reform medical guidelines, rewrite laws, and build a national con-
sensus around an individual's right to die with dignity.").
193. Perhaps the frequency of references to personal dignity is not so surprising in light
of the occasional puffery seen in legislative preambular declarations. It may surprise advocates
of formal recognition of the dignity right to find within the text of the United States Code a
Congressional reference to the "traditional American concept of the inherent dignity of the
individual in our democratic society." 42 U.S.C. § 3001 (1994).
194. See infra text accompanying notes 202-03.
195. Illustrative is the obligation "to assist our older people to secure equal opportunity to
the full and free enjoyment of... [r]etirement in health, honor, dignity- after years of contribu-
tion to the economy". 42 U.S.C. § 3001 (1994); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1701 q(a) (1994) (enabling
"elderly persons to live with dignity"); 42 U.S.C. § 3001 (citing Congressional finding that "the
fulfillment, dignity, and satisfaction of retirees still depend on the continuing development of
a consistent national retirement policy"); id. § 1485(yXI)(F) (1994) (enabling "frail elderly
persons residing in federally assisted housing to live with dignity and independence"); id.
§ 3021(aX1XA) (securing and maintaining maximum independence and dignity in a home
environment for older individuals capable of self care with appropriate supportive services");
id. § 3057a ("It is the sense of the Congress that older individuals who are Indians, older
individuals who are Alaskan Natives, and older individuals who are Native Hawaiian are a vital
resource entitled to all benefits and services available and that such services and benefits should
be provided in a manner that preserves and restores their respective dignity, self-respect, and
cultural identities."); id. § 8011(aXl)(B) (enabling "frail older persons and persons with
disabilities to maintain their dignity and independence"); id. § 8011(aX2)(D) (providing
"services - in a manner that respects the dignity of the elderly and persons with disabilities");
id, § 801 1(dX4XE) ("enabling frail elderly persons residing in federally assisted housing to live
with dignity and independence").
196. 42 U.S.C. § 8001 (1994) ("Congress finds that - congregate housing, coordinated
with delivery of supportive services, offers an innovative, proven, and cost-effective means of
enabling temporarily disabled or handicapped individuals to maintain their dignity and inde-
pendence and to avoid costly and unnecessary institutionalization."); id. § 8013 ("The purpose
of this section is to enable persons with disabilities to live with dignity and independence within
their communities by expanding the supply of supportive housing .... ."); id. § 12703(5)
(increasing "the supply of supportive housing, which combines structural features and services
needed to enable persons with special needs to live with dignity and independence").
197. Id. § 11301(aX6) (stating as finding that "the Federal Government has a clear respon-
sibility and an existing capacity to fulfill a more effective and responsible role to meet the basic
human needs and to engender respect for the human dignity of the homeless").
198. 15 U.S.C. § 3103 (a)(5) (1994) ("Unemployment exposes many families to social,
psychological, and physiological costs, including disruption of family life, loss of individual
dignity and self respect.... ."); see also HR. Rep. No. 95-1225, at 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978
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references appear in the parallel provisions of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions.' Individual states provide equivalents in state enactnents. e° Impor-
U.S.C.CAN. 5583, 5585 (summarizing provisions in legislative history of Veterans and
Survivors Improved Pension Act of 1978 to "assure a level of income above the minimum sub-
sistence level allowing veterans and their survivors to live out their lives in dignity").
Other references to dignity are scattered throughout the United States Code. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1116(bX4)(B) (1994) (setting forth punishment for "whoever kills or attempts to kill" a
person who "is entitled pursuant to international law to special protection against attack upon
his person, freedom, or dignity"); 22 U.S.C. § 290f(b) (1994) ("It is the purpose of this sec-
tion to provide support for developmental activities designed to achieve conditions in the
Western Hemisphere under which the dignity and the worth of each human person will be re-
spected. . . ."); id. § 2151-1 (enabling "them to satisfy their basic needs and lead lives of
decency, dignity, and hope"); 29 U.S.C. §3002(a)(7)(A)(i) (1994) (respecting "individual dig-
nity, personal responsibility, self determination, and pursuit of meaningful careers"); id.
§ 701(c) (same); 42 U.S.C. § 6601(bXl) (fostering "leadership in the quest for international
peace and progress toward human freedom, dignity, and well-being by enlarging the contribu-
tions of American scientists").
199. 7 C.F.R. Pt.1924, Subpt. A, Exh. 1 (2000) ("It is important that the design of the
Labor Housing site and buildings will help to create a pleasing lifestyle which will promote
human dignity and pride among its tenants"); id. § 275.12(cXl) (Food Stamp and Food Dis-
tribution Program: "Personal interviews shall be conducted in a manner that respects the rights,
privacy, and dignity of the participants."); id. § 3418.1 (noting requirements for recipients of
agriculture research, education, and extension formula funds: "Seek stakeholder input means
an open, fair, and accessible process by which individuals, groups, and organizations may have
a voice, and one that treats all with dignity and respect"); 20 C.F.R. § 416.110 (2000) (stating
that one of basic principles outlined in financial assistance programs for aged, blind, and
disabled is "[p]rotection of personal dignity. Under the Federal program, payments are made
under conditions that are as protective of people's dignity as possible."); 24 C.F.R. § 91.1
(2000) ("Decent housing also includes increasing the supply of supportive housing, which
combines structural features and services needed to enable persons with special needs, including
persons with HIV/AIDS and their families, to live with dignity and independence; and provid-
ing housing affordable to low-income persons accessible to job opportunities."); id. § 964.15
(HUD policy on resident management "Potential benefits of resident-managed entities include
improved quality of life, experiencing the dignity of meaningful work, enabling residents to
choose where they want to live, and meaningful participation in the management of the housing
development"); 28 C.F.R. § 512.11 (2000) (concerning inmate research projects: "In all
research projects the rights, health, and human dignity of individuals involved must be re-
spected."); 38 C.F.R. § 17.33(a) (2000) (Pensions, Bonuses, and Veterans' Relief. "Patients
have a right to be treated with dignity in a humane environment that affords them both reason-
able protection from harm and appropriate privacy with regard to their personal needs."); id.
§ 17.63 (stating that residents in community residential care facilities must "[b]e treated with
respect, consideration, and dignity."); id. § 36.4286(bXl) (Partial or Total Loss of Guaranty:
"Obtaining and retaining a lien of the dignity... "); 42 C.F.R. § 51b.103(c) (2000) (project
grants for preventive health services: "The application shall contain assurances that no one will
be denied services because of inability to pay, and that the services are provided in a manner
Which preserves human dignity and maximizes acceptance."); id. § 51c.303(m) ("A community
health center supported under this subpart must... [ble operated in a manner calculated to
preserve human dignity and to maximize acceptability and effective utilization of services.");
id. § 59.5(aX3) (requirements that must be met by a family planning project: "Provide services
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in a manner which protects the dignity of the individual."); id. § 405.2138(c) (Patient Rights:
"Standard: respect and dignity. All patients are treated with consideration, respect, and full
recognition of their individuality and personal needs, including the need for privacy in treat-
ment"); id. § 460A ("Maximize dignity of; and respect for, older adults."); id. § 460.7(aXl)(ii)
(PACE services recipients: "Ensure a safe, sanitary, functional, accessible, and comfortable
environment for the delivery of services that protects the dignity and privacy of the partici-
pant."); id. § 460.112 (PACE services recipients: "To be treated with dignity and respect, be
afforded privacy and confidentiality in all aspects of care, and be provided humane care."); id.
§ 483.15 ("A facility must care for its residents in a manner and in an environment that pro-
motes maintenance or enhancement of each resident's quality of life. (a) Dignity. The facility
must promote care for residents in a manner and in an environment that maintains or enhances
each resident's dignity and respect in full recognition of his or her individuality."); id.
§ 483.152(bX4Xiv) (requirements for approval of a nurse aide training and competency
evaluation program: "Allowing the resident to make personal choices, providing and reinforc-
ing other behavior consistent with the resident's dignity."); 43 C.F.R. § 26.3(b) (2000) (Youth
Conservation Corps: "objectives will be accomplished in a manner that will provide the youth
with an opportunity to acquire increased self-dignity and self-discipline"); 45 C.F.R. § 73.735-
301(a) (2000) ("An employee's conduct on the job is, in all respects, of concern to the Federal
government. Courtesy, consideration, and promptness in dealing with the public must be shown
in carrying out official responsibilities, and actions which deny the dignity of individuals or
conduct which is disrespectful to others must be avoided."); id. § 2551.11 ("Program funds are
used to support Senior Companions in providing supportive, individualized services to help
adults with special needs maintain their dignity and independence.").
200. ARK CODEANN. § 20-10-1003(bX3)(Michie 2000) (entitling residents of long-term
care facility to "[t]he right to dignity and respect"); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4502(b) (West
1998) (giving persons with developmental disabilities "[a] right to dignity, privacy and humane
care"); id. § 5325.1(b) (persons with mental illness have a "right to dignity, privacy, and humane
care"); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1901(aX2) (1995 & Supp. 2001) (specifying in statement of
purpose intent of Council of District of Columbia to "assure that... habitation is skillfully and
humanely provided with full respect for the person's dignity and personal integrity and in a
setting least restrictive of personal liberty"); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 393.13(2) (1998 & Supp.
2001) ("[p]ersons with developmental disabilities shall have a right to dignity, privacy, and
human care"); GA. CODE ANN. § 29-5-3(BXI) (1997 & Supp. 2001) (guardian of a person of
an incapacitated adult "[s]hall respect and maintain the individual rights and dignity of the ward
at all times"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 245.467, subd.1(8) (West 1998) ("[m]ental health
services... must be... provided under conditions which protect the rights and dignity of the
individuals being served"); id. § 245.4876, subd.1(10) (West 1998 & Supp. 2001) ("[c]hildren's
mental health services ... must be... provided under conditions that protect the rights and
dignity of the individuals being served"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-20-142(1) (1999) ("Persons
admitted to a residential facility for a period of habilitation shall.. . have a right to dignity,
privacy, and humane care"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-51 (1999) ("It is the policy of the State
to assure a basic human rights to each client of a [mental health, developmental disabilities, or
substance abuse] facility. These rights include the right to dignity, privacy, humane care, and
freedom from mental and physical abuse, neglect, and exploitation."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3721.13 (Anderson 1999) (giving residents of rest homes and nursing homes "[tihe right to
be free from physical, verbal, mental, and emotional abuse and to be treated at all times with
courtesy, respect, and full recognition of dignity and individuality"); R.L GEN. LAWS § 38-2-1
(1997 & Supp. 2000) ("The public's right to access to public records and the individual's right
to dignity and privacy are both recognized to be principles of the utmost importance in a free
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tantly, many of these materials, which include textual references to dignity,
are of recent vintage, indicating a growing popular and deliberative apprecia-
tion of individual dignity.20 1 Yet the dignity term continues to go undefined
in all of these materials, and in all but one instance in which a class of persons
is deemed to be entitled to dignity, there is little or no elaboration on what
entitlement to dignity actually entails, nor is dignity described as a "right."
The one specific context in which Congress and the several states have gone
beyond describing dignity as a precatory value and moved closer toward a
status of a right involves victims of crime. 2 The federal crime victims' act
provides that "[a] crime victim has... [t]he right to be treated with fairness
and with respect for the victim's dignity and privacy. '203 But again, dignity
is not defined and the nature of the "right" appears weak because the victim
of crime is entitled only to the best efforts of the federal government's
society."); W. VA. CODE § 16-5C-1 (1998 & Supp. 2000) ("[ilt is the policy of this state to
encourage, promote and require the maintenance of nursing homes so as to ensure protection
of the rights and dignity of those using the services of such facilities."); W. VA. CODE § 16-5D-1
(1998) ("lilt is the policy of this state to encourage, promote and require the maintenance of
personal care homes so as to ensure protection of the rights and dignity of those using the
services of personal care homes."); W. VA. CODE § 16-5H-1 (1998 & Supp. 2000) ("[I]t is the
policy of this state to encourage, promote and require the maintenance of residential board and
care homes so as to ensure protection of the rights and dignity of those using the services of
such residential board and care homes.").
201. The majority of these materials was enacted in the 1980s or later. Perhaps gradually,
the U.S. jurisdiction is heading toward a culture of legal dignity seen in some European
countries. For an insightfl comparative discussion of the legal recognition of honor, dignity,
and respect between the U.S., France and Germany, see James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility
andRespect. Three Societies, 109 YALE L.J. 179 (2000).
202. Proponents of victims' rights urge that victims' right to dignity should be at least
equal to that of the criminal defendant. Thus, if "even the lowest of the low, namely hateful
criminals" are owed dignity, Richard A. Posner, Social Norms, SocialMeaning, and Economic
Analyis of Law: A Comment, 27 J. LEG. STuDIms 553,557 (1998), then surely the victims of
such crimes should receive equal dignity.
203. 42 U.S.C. § 10606(bXl) (1994) (emphasis added). The full section reads as follows:
A crime victim has the following rights:
(1) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's
dignity and privacy.
(2) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused offender.
(3) The right to be notified of court proceedings.
(4) The right to be present at all public court proceedings related to the offense,
unless the court determines that testimony by the victim would be materi-
ally affected if the victim heard other testimony at trial.
(5) The right to confer with [the] attorney for the Government in the case.
(6) The right to restitution.
(7) The right to information about the conviction, sentencing, imprisonment,
and release of the offender.
Id. § 10606(b).
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agents2 4 and violation of the purported right of respect for dignity does not
allow a claim in the event of a failure to accord such respect. °" Likewise,
several states provide by their constitution or statute that victims of crimes
have a right "to be treated with dignity, respect, and fairness."'2' 6 Like the
federal counterpart, most state laws that provide enumerated rights for crime
victims specify that the law does not create a cause of action," 7 with only one
204. Id. § 10606(a) ("Officers and employees of the Department of Justice and other
departments and agencies of the United States engaged in the detection, investigation, or prose-
cution of crime shall make their best efforts to see that victims of crime are accorded the rights
described .... ")
205. Id. § 10606(c).
206. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24 ("Crime victims... shall have... the right to
be treated with dignity, respect, and fairness during all phases of the criminal and juvenile
justice process.. . ."); ARiz. CONST. art. I, § 2.1(AXI) ("[A] victim of crime has a right... [t]o
be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity... throughout the criminal justice process.");
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22 ("A crime victim... has the following rights: (1) To be treated with
fairness, respect, dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process."); ILL. CONST. art.
I, § 8.1(a) ("Crime victims... shall have.. . [t]he right to be treated with fairness and respect
for their dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process."); MICH. CONST. art. I
§ 24(1) ("Crime victims... shall have... [t]he right to be treated with fairness and respect for
their dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process."); N.M. CONST. art I, § 24
("[A] victim of [enumerated crimes] shall have the following rights as provided by law (1) the
right to be treated with fairness and respect for the victim's dignity and privacy throughout the
criminal justice process."); R.I. CONST. art I, § 23 ("A victim of crime shall, as a matter of right,
be treated by agents of the state with dignity, respect and sensitivity during all phases of the
criminal justice process .... "); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24(AXI) "Victims of crime have the right
to... be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity. . . throughout the criminal and juvenile
justice process. . . ."); TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 30(a)(1) ("A crime victim has... (1) the right to
be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and privacy .... "); UTAH
CONST. art. I, § 28(lXa) ("Victims of crimes have [the right] ... [t]o be treated with fairness,
respect, and dignity ... throughout the criminal justice process."); VA. CONST. art. I, § 8-A
("That in criminal prosecutions, the victim shall be accorded fairness, dignity and respect...
and ... may be accorded rights [including] ... [t]he right to be treated with respect, dignity and
fairness at all stages of the criminal justice system."); see also LA. CONST. art. I, § 25 ("Any
person who is a victim of crime shall be treated with fairness, dignity, and respect .... "); MD.
CONST. art. 47(a) ("A victim of crime shall be treated by agents of the State with dignity,
respect, and sensitivity during all phases of the criminal justice process."); OHIO CONST. art. I,
§ 10a ("Victims of criminal offenses shall be accorded fairness, dignity, and respect in the
criminal justice pros... ."); OKLA. CONST. art II, § 34(A) ("To preserve and protect the
rights of victims to justice and due process, and ensure that victims are treated with fairness,
respect and dignity, and are free from intimidation, harassment or abuse, throughout the
criminaljustie process."); OF- CONST. art. I, § 42 (1) ("[T]o ensure crime victims a meaningful
role in the criminal and juvenile justice systems, to accord [them] due dignity and respect.");
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 35 ("To ensure victims a meaningful role in the criminaljustice system
and to accord them due dignity and respect."); Wis. CONST. art. 1, § 9m ("This state shall treat
crime victims.., with fairness, dignity and respect for their privacy.").
207. LA. CONST. arL I, § 25; MD. CONST. art. 47(c); OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 10a; OR. CONST.
art. I, § 42(2); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24(B); UTAH CONST. art. , § 28(2).
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allowing for a mandamus action to compel compliance with the constitutional
or statutory provision."' Thus again, the rights status of dignity remains in
question,"0 9 and the lack of available remedies may actually work against a
characterization of dignity as a right, because one meanng of dignity is the
ability to assert a claim."' In any event, it appears that the federal and state
materials recognize an entitlement to dignity for persons of a certain condi-
tion, all of them involuntary. Such recognition is reminiscent of the under-
standing of dignity advanced by the philosopher Immanuel Kant - in part, that
dignity is not necessarily a means, but an inherent end in itself, requiring
every man to show respect for every other." Kant, of course, did not limit
the dignity owed to any class of persons, instead making it a universal require-
ment.212 Congress and the states appearto identify certainpersons as especially
entitled to dignity, reflecting a sense of respect for persons' worth, regardless
of their condition. It is a respect for these persons' integrity, whether physical,
psychic or otherwise.
213
208. The South Carolina Constitution does provide for a writ of mandamus, "to be issued
by any justice of the Supreme Court or circuit court judge to require compliance by any public
employee, public agency, the State, or any agency responsible for the enforcement of the rights
and provisions of these services contained in this section." S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24(B). There
are reports of a popular movement to include provisions allowing victims a cause of action
against officials who fail to notify them of their rights or to enforce them. Terry Carter,
Righting Victims' Rights: Activists Seek Cause-of-Action Clauses for Noncompliance, ABA.
3., Dec. 2000, at 24,24.
209. Dignity is referenced in the Illinois Constitution, but it does not give rise to a right
The state constitution includes a section entitled, "Individual Dignity," which provides: "To
promote individual dignity, communications that portray criminality, depravity or lack of virtue
in, or that incite violence, hatred, abuse or hostility toward, a person or group of persons by
reason of or by reference to religious, racial, ethnic, national or regional affiliation are con-
demned." ILL. CONST. art. I, § 20. In rejecting a plaintiff's claim for breach of a right to
dignity, under this constitutional provision, the court characterized the text as preambular and
not operative, which "was never intended to establish any new course of action. Irving v. J.L.
Marsh, Inc., 360 N.E.2d 983,984 (111. App. Ct. 1977).
210. Alan Gewirth, Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in CONSTrUioN OF RIGHTS,
supra note 153, at 10, 11.
211. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor
trans., ed. 1997); see also THOMAS E. HIL, JR., DIGNr rY AND PRACTICAL REASON IN KANT'S
MORAL THEORY 47-50, 53 (1992). Kant's work has influenced the way legal scholars think of
protecting intangible property. For a discussion of Kant, dignity and the right of publicity, see
Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383
(1999).
212. Professor Gewirth: "[Mian is obligated to acknowledge, in a practical way, the dignity
of humanity in every other man. Hence he is subject to a duty based on the respect which he
must show every other man." Gewirth, supra note 210, at 11 (quoting Kant).
213. See Henkin, supra note 153, at 210 ("[Hjuman dignity requires respect for every
individual's physical and psychic integrity.. ").
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A final bridge from the present discussion to a dignity-based right of
authors is the extension of the affirmation of a legal dignity owed especially
to those of an involuntary condition214 toward an entitlement of dignity to
those who have made choices. "Going back to Kant, and reflected in much of
modem liberalism," Professor Frederick Schauer writes, "a common way of
thinking about dignity focuses on the ability of the independent moral agent
to make choices about her life, the result of which is that deprivations of
dignity occur when those choices are neither respected nor permitted."215 For
authors specifically, the inquiry turns to whether one who chooses to be an
author or who chooses to create one work over another will have those choices
respected. 216 It is this respect that is advanced here as authorial dignity.
C. Dignity-Based Right ofintegrity
The imposition of one jurisdiction's legal doctrine onto another jurisdic-
tion whose socio-legal culture is different from the first raises obvious ques-
tions of fit. As discussed above, a poignant example may be the transplanting
of the French droit moral (designed for ajurisdiction whose priority in art and
deference to artisans is unmatched) onto American copyright culture whose
focus is more on the distribution of proprietary interests.217 A more inviting
system of personal rights protections for the American author should be based
on a more stateside rationale - perhaps an American understanding of per-
sonal dignity. Importantly, it is contemplated that the specifics of the dignity-
based right of integrity would be achieved through legislative enactment
rather than judge-made rule. The former has been more receptive to protec-
tions of authors than the latter.21 '8 American courts have been too reluctant to
create a judicially crafted moral rights doctrine, 219 and appear still undecided
214. In other words, one does not voluntarily choose to be a crime victim, or developmen-
tally disabled, or elderly.
215. Frederick Schauer, SpeakingfDignif, in CONSTUmlONoFRIGHTS, supra note 153,
at 178, 187.
216. An argument (of an existential nature) could be made that one being an atithor is not
a matter of choice. Authorship may be a matter of an immutable condition or individual destiny.
Note Maslow's statement "A musician must make music, an artist must paint, a poet must write,
if he is to be ultimately at peace with himself. What a man can be, he must be." BARTLETT'S
FAMILIAR QUOTATiONS 724 (16th ed. 1992) (emphasis added) (quoting ABRAHAM HAROLD
MASLOW, MOuVATION AND PERSONALITY (1954)).
217. See supra note 107 (referencing Kwall's commentary).
218. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Artists fared better
in state legislatures than they generally had in courts."), revg, 861 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y.
1994).
219. See Stevenson, supra note 38, at 111 ("This is a problem for the Congress and not the
courts."). A legislatively crafted moral rights doctrine in the United States will result in an
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or unequipped to enunciate rights based on individual dignity. In contrast,
Congress has already enacted the first federal moral rights statute in VARA;
and through various references to dignity, though in the most general terms,
it has shown a willingness to promote dignity interests, in at least one instance
elevating it to a dignity-based legal right.' ° The legislative vehicle also
invites the possibility of extending the current entitlement of dignity to an
actionable right based on violation of the dignity interest. Most importantly,
the path to the legislature also allows for compromise, which, as a practical
matter, will likely be crucial in the accommodation between an expanded
moral rights program and a copyright scheme with some history.
Before Congress confers any new protections,"1 it must declare initially
(perhaps as part of a legislative purpose) that American authors as a group are
entitled to a basic right of dignity that requires respect for them as creators,
for their work, and for the creative process.' Though authors may not fall
within a class of persons with an involuntary condition, they as a group may
be sufficiently discrete and their work of such public interest that Congress
may declare that the dntitlement to dignity should extend to authors.
Though art may not occupy the gloried status stateside that it does in France,
the recognition and preservation of art is still an American public policy
interest.2 4 Preliminarily, the declaration of an authorial dignity would likely
international irony- a French droit moral in a civil law jurisdiction initiated by judge-made rule,
and an American moral rights system in a common law jurisdiction crafted by legislative statute.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 202-03.
221. I am in agreement with those who state that Congressional authority to enact authors'
moral rights legislation is based on the copyright clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. E.g.,
Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right, supra note 17, at 70, 91.
222. As Professor Halpem reminds, "The fundamental question is one of societal values:
how do we value the artistic or creative persona apart from the property interest in the creation?"
Halpem, supra note 25, at 80.
223. Identifying authors and artists in this way will likely lead to charges of elitism.
Indeed, a moral rights system that allows creators to have peremptory powers over the rights of
property owners has been described not only as "elitist," Carter, supra note 93, at 102; Zlatarski,
supra note 16, at 204, 206 n.18, but also "despotic,' Carter, supra note 93, at 102. Responds
Professor Justin Hughes, "Never mind that on economic indicators, it is usually the property
owner - the art collector, the studio mogul - who is more 'elite' than the creator who would
have the moral rights." Hughes, The Personality Interest ofArtists and Inventors, supra note
22, at 137. Moreover, given Congressional recognition of an entitlement to dignity for various
classes of persons, it is not the case that only authors would have a dignity-based right when
others do not, as some have suggested. See Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147,208 (1998) ("We
don't see why authorial dignity is so important that it's entitled to special protection where other
dignity interests are not").
224. Note the Gilliam court's view of the relationship between law and the arts: "[Tihe
copyright law should be used to recognize the important role of the artist in our society and the
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face little political opposition because, as a general statement, few could be
opposed to dignity of any persons or group. The more difficult question is
what such dignity would entail - that is, what would be the costs of an
authorial dignity? This discussion follows, after an important aside on the
scope of authors that a dignity-based right would protect.
Currently, the federal statute that provides for the rights of attribution and
integrity applies only to the category of visual artists.' This narrow scope
has been the subject of criticism. 6 There appears little explanation for such
limitation, other than the great success of the lobbying efforts of those who
exploit the works of authors - publishers and motion picture producers and
distributors, for example. Given that the influence and economic interests of
these groups are substantial, the proposed dignity-based right of integrity,
which envisions protecting authors more broadly,' will again test Congres-
sional mettle. It is a quandary between advancing artist protections and ap-
peasing powerful lobbies.
One criticism leveled by opponents of an extensive moral rights system
in the United States is that the rights of attribution, disclosure, and integrity
would apply to an infinite number of authors, all ofwhom would allege person-
ality interests in their works. For example, could a cabinetmaker,' an office
memo writer,' or a room decorator' 0 also seek protection against changes in
her handiwork - the cabinet, the memo, and the room, respectively - given that
each is the result of deeply personal labors and a reflection of the creator's
spiritual presence?"1 On one score, the question fairly highlights the difficulty
of defining the bounds of those who could and should claim personal rights.
Yet the task of definition, of inclusion and exclusion, upon deliberation and
compromise, is precisely the type of line drawing that is the function of the
legislature. Initially, Congress has a general authority to enact legislation
need to encourage production and dissemination of artistic works by providing adequate legal
protection for one who submits his work to the public." Cilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d
14,23 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954)).
225. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining "work of visual art" and providing specific exclu-
sions); id. § 106A(a) (applying to "author ofa work of visual art").
226. E.g., Damich, The VisualArtists RightsAct of 1990, supra note 16, at 951-58.
227. For a comprehensive examination of the definition of '.author" within the copyright
scheme, see Russ VerSteeg, Defining "Author"for Purposes of Copyright, 45 AM. U. L. REV.
1323 (1996).
228. Fisher, supra note 93, at 1773 n.494.
229. Leval, supra note 95, at 1128.
230. Beyer, supra note 25, at 1085-86.
231. Or, "Could we imagine giving a plumber a control over the pipes she installs even
after the work is paid for, or a cabinet maker the right to veto the conversion of her writing desk
into a television cabinet?" James D.A. Boyle, The Search for anAuthor: Shakespeare and the
Framers, 37 AM U. L. REV. 625,629 (1988).
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regarding matters relating to "useful Arts" and "writings." 2 2 In determining
the bounds of protected creators and creations for the dignity-based approach,
Congress need not define art, a task that may well be impossible, nor need
Congress be correct in its first effort. Congress may well choose to exclude the
cabinet, the office memo, or the decorated room. In all events, the limitation
to visual artists for the protection of moral rights is an unusually stringent
component of American law that continues to draw suspicion," and the
argument that virtually "anything under the sun"" could receive protection
should not so sweepingly deprive all other authors of the personal interests
stemming from their work.
Under the proposed moral rights system herein, authors would be en-
titled to authorial dignity, such that as creators of their work, they and their
work are accorded a certain respect. This approach accepts the view that the
created work reflects the author's person and personality. Though this view
may appear identical to the French model of respect for the auteur and the
creative process, 5 the specific rights that flow from the dignity-based ap-
proach will be mindful of the American socio-legal fabric and values. Stated
briefly, those authors who are granted a dignity-based right of integrity would
have:
(i) the right to prior notification of another's unauthorized alteration 6
or use" 7 of the work beyond the intentions of the author;25
(ii) the right to object and request less drastic alternative alteration or
use still acceptable to the author;
232. U.S. CONST. art. , § 8, cl. 8 (stating that Congress has powerto "promotethe Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
233. See supra note 225. The enactment of VARA was described as "a triumph of prin-
ciple over moneyed interests." Damich, The VisualArtists Rights Act of 1990, supra note 16,
at 947.
234. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. No. 82-1979,
at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399; H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)),
noted in Cotter, supra note 15, at 38 n.202.
235. See supra text accompanying note 45.
236. For ease of reference, the term "alteration" is used to include any change, modifica-
tion, distortion, mutilation, or the like.
237. "Use" is the counterpart here to the Berne Convention's "derogatory action." Berne
Convention, supra note 53, art. 6bis(1).
238. The notification requirement would perhaps necessitate a national registration of all
eligible authors and their work for which protection is sought Such registration could include,
for example, the author's name, contact information, a description of the work, and its intended
use. In practice, this might reduce the number of authors to those seriously interested in main-
taining the integrity of their work. Discussion is invited on what impact the failure to provide
notification should have on the parties' positions in any ensuing litigation.
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(iii) failing resolution," 9 the right to bring a claim for violation of the
author's right of integrity, with the burden on the author to show
how the challenged alteration or use violates the author's dignity
interest, and the tribunal's disposition to take into account, princi-
pally, the balancing of the author's dignity interest and the compet-
ing interest of the opposing party;
(iv) the dignity-based right of integrity for the duration of the author's
life; and
(v) the right to voluntary transfer and waiver of the above rights.
Elaborating, the requirements of notifying the author of alterations in her
work or use contrary to her intentions and of allowing the author to voice an
objection sound of protections in procedural due process. Granted, the twin
requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard are not normally due when
state action is not present,240 nevertheless, the prerequisites to procedural pro-
tections notwithstanding, individual dignity is one interest served by proce-
dural due process.24 Being informed of actions taken against one's interests
and the ability to make one's case in opposition are desired ends that are
consistent with an American understanding of fairness in process."' They are
inherent in what Professor Tribe refers to as valuing process and heeding the
"independent value of respecting personal dignity."'24
239. A requirement could be added that the parties confer and in good faith attempt to
resolve the dispute in advance of litigation. The alternative dispute resolution component, along
with prior notification to the author and the author's option to request less drastic alteration or
use, may be administrative prerequisites that must be exhausted before commencement of any
action by the plaintiff author. The dispute resolution attempts could be administered by the
Registrar of Copyrights or a court-appointed mediator. A full elaboration of the methods of
dispute resolution alternative to a civil action involving authors' rights is beyond the scope of
this Article. For a general discussion on dispute resolution in the intellectual property context,
see Scott H. Blackmand & Rebecca M. McNeillAlternative Dispute Resolution in Commercial
IntellectualPropertyDisputes, 47 AM. UL. REV. 1709 (1998).
240. Kentucky Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) ("We examine
procedural due process questions in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a liberty or
property interest which has been interfered with by the State .... ).
241. See Developments in the Law, Zoning and Procedural Due Process, 91 HAE.V. L.
REV. 1427, 1502, 1505 (1978), cited with approval in Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of
Arlington Heights, 469 F. Supp. 836, 860 (N.D. 111 1979), aff'd, 616 F.2d 1006 (7th Cir. 1980).
The other interests served by procedural due process are efficiency and representation. See
Developments in the Law, supra, at 1505.
242. See Harry F. Tepker, Jr., The Arbitrary Path ofDue Process, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 197,
197 (2000) ("'Due process,' one of the most familiar of legal phrases, is a promise of our
culture's legal tradition.").
243. Laurence H. Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a
Pseudo-Scientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155,157 (1984). He explains:
It is said that, before God expelled Adam from the Garden of Eden for eating of the
Tree of Life, He gave Adam a moment to regain his composure and asked him why
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Failing resolution, the author may advance against the party engaging in
unauthorized alteration or use a claim of the dignity-based right of integrity.
The burden falls squarely on the author to show how the defendant's alter-
ation or use of the work violates her authorial dignity, that is, how it disres-
pects the plaintiff author's role as creator, her work, or the creative process.
As noted above, the author benefits from an initial presumption that her work
is an extension of her personality. Importantly, however, the dignity-based
right of integrity is not absolute,2" nor should it take on a presumption of
priority. Because there is a competing interest of the user, resolution requires
a weighing and balancing 5 of the author's dignity interest in preserving the
integrity of her work against the opposing party's interest, whether based on
property (as will normally be the case) or some other ground.246 To reach a
decision, the court must take into account the nature ofthe author's work, the
author's intentions in creating the work, the extent of the alteration or use
complained of, and the defendant's own intent and motivation behind the
alteration.247 With regard to the nature ofthe alteration or use, the court could
consider, where appropriate, the industry practice, the foreseeability of such
alteration or use at the time of the creation, and the impact of allowing such
alteration or use on the public interest.4 Also pertinent may be the nature of
he had taken a bite. You might wonder about the reason for God's inquiry. Surely
it was not to reduce the risk of divine error - to minimize the costs of an inefficient
adversarial process. It was a matter of process for its own sake, rather like the code
of Wild Bill Hickocic never shoot a man until you've looked him in the eye. That
is, God's inquiry was an affirmation of the dignity even of those who had strayed.
Id. (emphasis added).
244. Even the French droit moral does not prohibit modifications of a work necessary to
present it in a different medium. DaSilva, supra note 25, at 35. See Dominique Giocanti,
MoralRights: Authors'Protection and Business Needs, 10 J. INT'LL. & ECON. 627, 641-42
(1976) (discussing French court's decision on permissible work of cinematographic adaptor).
Nor are changes for restoration purposes actionable under the dignity-based test. VARA
includes a similar exception. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c) (1994) (excepting "modification ... [as] a
result of the passage of time or the inherent nature of the materials").
245. Commentators with an eye toward reforming the American moral rights doctrine have
urged the need for the balancing of interests. Kwall, Co right and the MoralRight, supra note
17, at 92 (urging "balancing of interests of creators, copyright proprietors, owners of copy-
righted works, and the public" in adoption of moral rights doctrine); see also Amarnick, supra
note 15, at 35 (urging moral rights statute that considers "conglomeration of interests").
246. There may be instances when the user advances her own dignity interest. Take for ex-
ample, a commissioned work of art, a portion of which the purchaser finds shocking, degrading,
offensive, or immoral. The artist may claim that alteration of the work infringes her dignity,
while the purchaser argues with equal force that displaying the work unaltered disrespects her
sense of dignity.
247. That defendant's alteration or use was motivated by bad faith or ill will should not
work in her favor.
248. For example, the court could consider the impact of its decision on the nation's cul-
tural heritage and preservation of its arts. It should be noted here that although the dignity-
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the relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff author, for instance,
whether they work in collaboration or are strangers in the marketplace. With
consideration of these relevant factors, the balancing test provides the court
with a means and flexibility to address a host of situations - the hypersensitive
author who protests minor or incidental alterations in her work (probably in
favor of the defendant), the party whose alteration seeks only economic
interests against an author who presents a strong dignity interest (a stronger
case for the author), and the defendant whose alteration or use is based on
some constitutionally-based interest against a strong dignity interest (a diffi-
cult case).
In essence, it is the dignity-based standard's consideration of the author's
dignity and balancing of the author's interest versus that of the user of the
work that are woefully absent in VARA, the only federal moral rights scheme.
Importantly, the dignity-based approach also proposes a substantive standard
different than that of the statute. Putting aside the procedural protections
(which VARA does not provide), the federal statute provides relief for the
author if the alteration or use is "prejudicial" to the author's "honor or reputa-
tion. 2 49 These terms are not defined in the statute, and references to them in
the legislative history are not particularly illuminating for courts. To date,
only one reported case offers an indication of ajudicial understanding ofthese
terms. In the district court's decision in Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc.,"0
though reversed on other grounds, the court referred to Webster's and declared
that "prejudicial," "honor," and "reputation" have readily understood mean-
ings."1 Thus, the court stated that in determining whether the prejudice to
honor or reputation standard has been met, it would "consider whether such
alteration would cause injury or damage to plaintiffs' good name, public
esteem, or reputation in the artistic community."" 2
based integrity right initially would be permitted by legislative enactment, the contours of the
right ultimately would be shaped by judicial application and interpretation.
249. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(aX2) (1994). The language tracks the standard presented in Beme
Convention, supra note 53, art. 6bis.
250. 861F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1994),rev'd, 71F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995).
251. Id. at 323. The court stated:
"Prejudice" is commonly understood to mean "injury or damage due to some judg-
ment of another." Webster's Third New International Dictionary (unabridged)
1788 (1971). "Honor" is commonly understood to mean "good name or public
esteem." Id. at 1087. "Reputation" is commonly understood to mean the condition
of"being regarded as worthy or meritorious." Id. at 1929. Use of these definitions
will not cause a result that runs contrary to VARA's purpose. Therefore, this Court
is convinced that these definitions were intended by VARA's draftrs to be applied
in interpreting the statute.
Id.
252. 861 F. Supp. at 323. Preliminary thoughts on the honor/reputation vs. dignity stan-
dard are offered here. The dictionary definition of "honor" suggests that the precise meaning
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The difficulty with the reputational standard is that though it seeks some
objective measurement of injury to the author, it neglects her personal or
personality interests.' 5 Although authors do have an interest in their commer-
cial and professional reputation, the reputation standard does not adequately
capture the more fundamental interest of the author, that of respect for the
author's dignity as a creator of works. Moreover, as commentators have
alluded, there may well be instances when an unauthorized alteration or use
of the author's work results in an enhanced community reputation or eco-
nomic benefit.' VARA precludes the author's relief in such cases, even if
of the term is no less elusive than that for dignity. Moreover, as between honor and dignity, the
former has received far less attention in the legal commentary. At first glance, it appears that
courts may be better equipped to apply the reputation standard over that for honor because the
former is often seen in the libel context Otto W. Konrad, A Federal Recognition of Perfor-
mance ArtAuthor Moral Rights, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1579,1637 (1991). But Professor
Kwall notes that "the appropriate standard for evaluating an author's reputation is not analogous
to showing reputation in a defamation case, and that any evidence with regard to such a showing
is 'irrelevant.'" Kwall, How Fine Art Fares Post VARA, supra note 25, at 13 n.66 (citing H.R.
REP. No. 101-514, at 15 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915,6925).
253. Perhaps harm to reputation could be relevant in assessing relief after a dignity viola-
tion has been found.
254. See, e..g., SAm RIcKETsoN, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
LrrERARY Am ARTisTIc WoRIs: 1886-1986, at 472 (1987) (stating that Berne Convention's
criterion of prejudice to honor or reputation of author "is not necessarily appropriate to a
situation where an author feels that his artistic intentions have been betrayed by a particular
performance or production of his work, but the latter nonetheless has considerable claim to
being a valid artistic statement"); Konrad, supra note 252, at 1637 ("[E]ven if an author has a
reputational interest, the public may perceive the distortion to the author's work as benefitting
the author's reputation rather than harming it"); Kwall, How Fine Art Fares Post VARA, supra
note 25, at 14 ("Situations can and do arise in which a defendant's alteration of a work perverts
the author's artistic integrity, but nonetheless stimulates interest in the original work."). An
illustration in this regard is the author's own experience, regarding submissions of pieces for
an op-ed column of an English newspaper in Seoul, Korea. The newspaper published some
articles exactly as I had submitted them. For a subsequent piece, however, the editors made
several stylistic changes without seeking my consent, indeed without contacting me at all. The
changes did not affect the length of the article, nor did they substantially affect its overall theme,
but they did result (in my view) in noticeably awkward phrases and poor style. Acquaintances
to whom I had pointed out the differences between the submitted and published text informed
me that few if anyone would notice the awkward phrasing or poor style and that any negative
inferences drawn from my authorship would be far outweighed by the great publicity I had
received - an article with a byline and an accompanying photograph. I was advised that my
name, esteem, and reputation in the community were enhanced by publication of the article,
faults and all. My view was that I would have gladly declined these rewards (and the nominal
compensation received for writing each article) in exchange for the basic respect that an author
should be given, which should include prior notice of changes that the newspaper intended to
make and the option of not going forward with publication (thereby being relieved of the task
of disassociating myself with text that I did not author). For me, the final breaking point
occurred when my cousin, an English teacher at a high school in Seoul, reported that he proudly
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the alteration or use results in a great violation of the author's dignity. The
dignity-based standard would better capture the personality interest.
As to the duration and alienability of the dignity-based right of integrity,
the right would be effective for the author's life and subject to waiver at the
author's wishes. Conceptually, the dignity-based right of integrity is a per-
sonal right, one that demands respect for the author's person (and the person's
artist), her personhood,"5 and inviolate personality, as reflected in her cre-
ation. All of these interests must be said to terminate with the death of the
author." s The dignity-based approach would also make alienable the right of
integrity because this approach emphasizes not the "inherent worth" of all
humans, but rather respect for the particular artist and her work. This distinc-
tion in place, then, dignity by itself would be an inalienable right whereas
respect for authorial dignity is left to the wishes of the individual author.
Thus, the author may choose to transfer or waive the dignity-based right of
integrity in consideration for some other benefit. 7 As under VARA, any
transfer or waiver should be voluntary and memorialized; the author is pre-
sumed to otherwise retain the dignity-based right.
Implementation of the specific protections proposed under the dignity-
based approach requires significant change of, and some accommodation for,
the current copyright law. For instance, JfVARA were the starting point, the
statute must be revised (and re-named) to expand the category of authors from
showed one of my articles to his students, beaming, "This is my cousin. And this is how you
are to write in English."
255. The in in the Korean in-gyuck-kwon is derived from the Chinese character that appears
to show the basic outline of a person. See GRANT, supra note 125, at 28.
256. The dignity-based interest terminates at the life of the author. It should be noted that
in some jurisdictions, a celebrity's claim of the right of publicity passes to her estate upon her
death. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 3344.1(cXd) (West Supp. 2001); 765 IL. CoMP. STAT. 1075115
(1993); IND. CoDEANN. § 32-13-1-16 (Mcihie 1995); KY. RLV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (Miehie
1999); NEv. REV. STAT. 597.800 (2000); Omo RLrV. CODE ANN. § 2741.04 (Anderson 2000);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 12, § 1448 (West Supp. 2001); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 63.60.030
(West Supp. 2001). The right of publicity also has been described as one protecting individual
dignity interest. See Haemmerli, supra note 211; Kahn, supra note 161.
257. As a practical matter, this rule may force publishers and art dealers to demand a
waiver of the author's moral rights, including the dignity-based right, as a matter of business.
Indeed, commentators have noted the marketplace reality and the bargaining position of the
author. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (listing commentators).. A survey taken by
the Copyright Office after then enactment of VARA shows "that written waivers may become
increasingly common with respect to commissioned works and works incorporated into build-
ings." See MARYBETHPETRU.S. COPYRIGtT OFFICE, WAIVEROFMORALRI1GHS INVISUAL
ARTWORKS: FNALREPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, MARCH1,1996 (1996),notedin
Cotter, supra note 15, at 26 & n.139. Yet, oral contracts in some settings still take place, and
in all events, the proposed dignity-based right would provide a default for those who cannot
reach written agreement.
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visual artists to a more inclusive group." In addition, procedural due process
components of notification and objection would have to be inserted and the
prejudice to honor or reputation standard would have to be replaced by the
dignity-based standard requiring consideration of authorial dignity and balanc-
ing of competing interests. The duration and alienability provisions in VARA
are restored in the proposal herein. With these not insignificant changes
adopted, the proposed dignity-based standard contemplates the intactness of
the rest of the copyright scheme. For example, the dignity-based right of
integrity would be independent of authors' exclusive rights to copyrighted
works; 9 not apply to works made for hire;2"c and be subject to fair use.
261
The commentary includes significant discussion on the latter two - the merits
of excluding works made for hire from moral rights protection,22 and argu-
ments as to why the fair use doctrine should not apply to moral rights
issues63 On both points, the debate and discussion toward a more informed
policy should continue. Yet the rules governing works made for hire and fair
use2" have become such an ingrained part of the American copyright culture
258. As acknowledged above, this involves the unenviable task of line drawing. See supra
text accompanying notes 228-34.
259. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (1994) (noting that section is "independent of the exclusive
rights provided in section 106").
260. Currently, VARA applies only to works of visual art, id, and works made for hire are
specifically excluded from the definition of "work[s] of visual art," id. § 101 ("A work of visual
art does not include... any work made for hire .... ).
261. Id. § 106A(a) ("Subject to section 107 .... "). Section 107 provides in part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 ("Exclusive rights in copyrighted
works") and 106A ("Rights of certain authors to attribution and integrity"), the fair
use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for class-
room use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.
Id. § 107.
262. See Kwall, How Fine Art Fares Post VARA, supra note 25, at 10-12 (calling for
amendment of VARA to provide for more enhanced moral rights protections for artists, subject
to limitations). But see Peter H. Karlen, "Joint Ownership ofMoralRights," 38 3. COPR. Soc'Y
U.SA 242, 263-65 (1991) (arguing that interests of employers outweigh those of employee
artists, such that work for hire doctrine should work to limit artists' moral rights protections).
263. See Ciolino, supra note 45, at 33 (arguing that fair use doctrine, which permits use
of copyrighted work without authorization for such purposes as criticism, comment, news
reporting, or education use, is incompatible with moral rights). But see Geri . Yonover, The
Precarious Balance: Moral Rights, Parody, and Fair Use, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.. 79,
86 (1996) (arguing that "under fair use an artist's moral right of integrity should in most
circumstances yield to the right of the parodist").
264. It has been noted that the fair use doctrine in copyright is constitutionally-based. See
Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1378 (1993) ("[T]he fair use
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that the specter of a moral rights program eliminating these rules would likely
be seen as overarching and be rejected altogether. This is one point of accom-
modation and compromise.
D. Dignity-Based Right oflntegrity in Application
Helpful in the understanding of the dignity-based protections introduced
above is the application of the proposed test to three cases in which a moral
rights claim was advanced: Shostakovich v. Twentieth Cenury-Fox Film
Corp.,265 Choe v. Fordham Univ. School of Law,2" and Huston v. la Cinq. I
These cases involved, respectively, a musical composer, a law review com-
ment author, and a film director, all of whom would be covered under the
proposed dignity-based system. The three cases vividly illustrate the authors'
passion for the integrity of their work. In two of the three cases (involving the
composer Shostakovich and director Huston), the authors failed to vindicate
their integrity interest stateside, but prevailed inthe French courts. Under the
dignity-based proposal then (and assuming unsuccessful resolution between
the parties after receipt of notification of, and protest against, the proposed
alteration or use of the author's work), how might the dignity-based right of
integrity apply practically? The application provides a revealing look at the
nature of the court's general task - the balancing of the competing interests
and consideration of the appropriate factors.
Plaintiffs in Shostakovich, world renowned musical composers and citi-
zens of the then Soviet Union, brought an action against the company that
doctrine encompasses all claims of [Flirst [A]mendment in the copyright field") (quoting New
Era Publ'ns. Int'l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576,584 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001) ("We note that First
Amendment concerns in copyright are allayed by the presence of the fair use doctrine."). First
Amendment protections have also become part of the American socio-legal culture. See David
A. Anderson, Metaphorical Scholarship, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1205, 1217 (1991) (reviewing
STEVEN I-SLHFRN, THE FIRSTAMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990)) ('No one
would deny that the [F]irst [A]mendment is more than a legal rule.... [T]he [F]irst [A]mend-
ment plays a role in American culture beyond its legal role."); see also Ronald K.L. Collins &
David M. Skover, Pissingin the Snow: A CulturalApproach to the FirstAmendment, 45 STAN.
L. REV. 783,805 (1993) (reviewing JAMES B. TwrrCHELT, CARNIVALCULTURE: THE TRASHiNG
OF TASTM INAMERICA (1992)) ("Americans adore their First Amendment freedoms.").
265. 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1948), affld, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (N.Y. App. Div.
1949).
266. 920 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff'd, 81 F.3d 319 (2d Cir. 1996).
267. Judgment of May 28, 1991, Cass. Civ. ire, 149 R.I.D.A. 197 (1991), noted in
Netanel, supra note 29, at 388 n.182. A discussion of the case (along with an English trans-
lation of the French decision) is available in Jane C. Ginsburg & Pierre Sirinelli, Authors and
Exploitations in International Private Law: The French Supreme Court and the Huston Film
Colorization Controversy, 15 COILUM.-VIAJ.L. &ARTS 135, 159 (1991).
58 WASH. &LEE L. REV 795 (2001)
produced and distributed a film whose soundtrack included their musical
compositions." The composers' names were included in the credits at the
end of the film. 69 The alleged wrong here was the use ofthe plaintiffs' music
in a film "whose theme is objectionable to them in that it is unsympathetic to
their political ideology.""2 The plaintiffs also advanced a libel claim, arguing
that the film's use of their music indicated their approval, endorsement, and
participation in the movie "thereby casting upon them 'the false imputation of
being disloyal to their country,"' as well as the implied consent, approval, or
collaboration in the movie's production and distribution. 1  In one of the
earlier decisions that declined to recognize the moral rights doctrine, 2  a
New York court summarily rejected all ofthe composers' claims.273 The same
dispute in a French court, however, led to a decision in favor of the plain-
tiffs.
274
Even allowing that the plaintiffs in Shostakovich could have voiced their
objections more passionately, knowing of the dignity-based standard, the facts
do not appear to present a strong case for a violation of authorial dignity, that
is, a disrespect for the plaintiffs as composers of their music. Reasonable
minds may differ, but the argument that use of one's music in a film that is
merely "unsympathetic" to one's political ideology and leads to a misleading
perception of one's approval, consent, endorsement, orparticipationin a movie
does not appear to strike at the central authorial dignity interest of personality
and personhood" The nature of the objected use also works in favor of the
defendant producer and distributor here. As the court explained, the use ofthe
plaintiffs' music could best be described as "incidental, background matter.
Aside from the use of their music neither the plot nor the theme of the play,
268. The film was entitled "The Iron Curtain." Shostakovich, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 576. Plain-
tiffs conceded that all of the music was in the public domain and had no copyright protection.
Id. at 577.
269. The credit line read: "Music - From The Selected Works of the Soviet Composers -
Dimitry Shostakovich, Serge Prokofieff Aram Khachaturian, Nicholai Miashovsky [the Plain-
tiffs] - Conducted by Alfred Newman." Id. at 576.
270. Id. at 578.
271. Id.
272. "In the present state of our law the very existence of the right is not clear, the relative
position of the rights thereunder with reference to the rights of others is not defined nor has the
nature of the proper remedy been determined." Id. at 579.
273. Id. at 578-79.
274. See Soc. Le Chant du Monde v. Soc. Fox Europe, Jan. 13, 1953, Cours d'appel, Paris,
Dallez, Jurisprudence, D. Jur. 16, 80, noted in Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right, supra
note 17, at28 &n.103.
275. Perhaps a different outcome should result if the nature of the author's work is closely
identified with a particular cause and is used to promote a conflicting or drastically different
cause.
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in any manner, concerns plaintiffs. '276 Thus, the proposed dignity-based
standard applied to Shostakovich would favor the defendant user.
A more current parallel to the facts in Shostakovich can be seen in the use
by political campaigns of songs of popular musical artists. Examples are the
use of Bruce Springsteen's Born in the USA.27 and Bobby McFerrin's Don't
Worry, Be Happy 8 by various political candidates for national officeY 9 As
discussed above in the application of the dignity-based standard to the facts
in Shostakovich, unauthorized use of an artist's music in a medium espousing
certain political themes that the artist opposes, resulting in the possibility of
public perception of author endorsement and association, is not by itself
sufficient to establish a violation of the author's dignity interest. To distin-
guish themselves from the plaintiffs in Shostakovich, artists like Springsteen
and McFerrin would have to offer a stronger case for violation of authorial
dignity. Perhaps the most optimum situation would allow the author to show
that her own works promote and advance social or political views so contrary
to those of the candidate's campaign that the use of the author's songs to
promote the latter amounts to disrespect for the author's personality that is
reflected in the music.1 ° In addition, the author's case would be more en-
276. Shostakovich, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 576. The court also described as "incidental" the use
of the name of one plaintiff when in one scene, a character is shown placing a recording of the
particular plaintiff on a phonograph. Id. at 577. "[Tihe name is mentioned in an appreciative,
familiar fashion, the impression given being that the character has come upon a record of a
composition which he recognizes and appreciates hearing." Id.
277. Bruce Springsteen, Born in the US.A., on BoRN IN THE U.SA. (Columbia Records
1984).
278. Bobby McFerrin, Don't Wony, Be Happy, on SIMLE PLEASURS (EMI Manhattan
Records 1995).
279. President Ronald Reagan used Born in the U.SA. at campaign events during his re-
election bid in 1984. Springsteen "publicly ripped the president, calling the gesture a misuse
of the song and its meaning." Sean Piccoli, Pop Music lsPlayingPolitics, ORLANDo SENTINEL,
July 3,2000, at F3, available at2000 WL 3616330. Presidential candidate George -LW. Bush
used McFerrins' Don't Worry, Be Happy in 1988, until McFerrin threatened to sue. Lloyd
Grove, Fine-Tuning from Democrats, THE REcORD (Northern New Jersey), Nov. 7, 1991, at
C15, available at 1991 WL 7500801; Gillian Harris, Labour GoingforSong in Scotland, THE
TIMES (London) Feb. 11, 1999, at 12, available at 1999 WL 7972247. Bush finished the
campaign with Woodie Guthrie's ThisLand is Your Land. Bret McCabe, Campaign SongsSay
Very Little About Candidates, FT. WORTH STAR-TELERAM, Nov. 5,2000, available at 2000
WL 28289235. For a list of presidential candidates, the songs used in their campaigns, and the
artists' reaction to such use, see Sour Notes, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 2,2000, at 12, available at2000
WL 24485473. Under Shostakovich, as well as under current American moral rights law, it is
doubtful that these artists could have prevailed on a moral rights claim against politicians' use
of their songs in campaign events.
280. As between Springsteen and McFerrin, the former could have better made this case.
"Springsteen wrote Born in the USA. as a wry critique of America under Ronald Reagan.
[Springsteen] then stood back and watched, horriffiled, as it was adopted as a flag-waving, xeno-
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hanced ifthe use of her work in the particular medium was not incidental, but
a major part of the presentation."8
Perhaps a stronger argument for violation of authorial dignity than that
seen in Shostakovich is made by the plaintiffs protestations in Choe.m
There, the author of a law review comment alleged that the defendant journal
and its editors had mutilated283 and mangled.. his work before publication,
presenting a "garbled and distorted version" of his work."8 The "numerous
substantive and typographical errors" and "the mutilations that occurred on
nearly every single page" in the published product left Choe "horrified."
286
According to the plaintiff, the attribution of authorship left readers to think
that he was "a terrible writer," and "very sloppy, careless, and stupid."' Ex-
pressions of author outrage are certainly germane in the determination of
whether a dignity interest has been infringed, but unilateral declarations
cannot be conclusive. Such declarations must be viewed in context of the
specific alteration in the case, which, according to the court was not substan-
tial, suggesting an overly sensitive author. As the court noted, the plaintiff
acknowledged that readers "would uncover the essential meaning and ...
realize that it is a good, well-researched, and argued piece." 's
Also pertinent in Choe are the nature of the relationship between the
plaintiff author and the defendant, the industry norms, and the foreseeability
of the challenged alterations. The relationship between an author and editor
phobic anthem by the American right Reagan himself, referring to the tune, dubbed Springsteen
a 'great patriot'." Andrew Smith, Beat the System: How Come Dance Music Is Mix'ng It with
Politics?, THB GUARDIAN, Oct 28,1994, atT010, available at 1994 WL 9716874.
281. For example, the nature of the use would have more impact if the author's song is
provided as background music in a 30-second television commercial with no other audio than
the use of the same song at a campaign rally where it is one of several played.
282. Choe v.Fordham Univ. Sch. ofLaw, 920 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1995),ajf'd, 81 F.3d
319 (2d Cir. 1996). The case is discussed in some detail in Robert Rosenthal Kwall, Moral
Rights for University Employees and Students: Can Educational Institutions Do Better Than
the US. CopyrightLaw?, 27 J.C. & U.L. 53 (2000).
283. Choe, 920 F. Supp. at 45,46.
284. Id. at46.
285. Id. This setting certainly preys on the sympathies of the typical law professor in light
of their experiences of frustration with law review editors. See supra note 116.
286. Choe, 920 F. Supp. at 46.
287. Id. at 47. The court's frequent use of the "[sic]" notation to indicate errors in
quotations of Choe's testimony and papers does little to dissuade the opinion's readers from
inferring the plaintiff's sloppiness and carelessness. See id. at 46 (six), 47 (two).
288. Id. at 47. Indeed, that readers would understand the comment in the form published
"was borne out when a student note in the Stanford Law Review cited accurately Choe's argu-
ment in two footnotes." Id. "Choe conceded at his deposition that the Stanford Note recorded
accurately his Comment's argument" Id.
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in virtually all settings is such that some collaboration and negotiation occur
between the two throughout the editing process. Both sides agree to alter-
ations in the text, sometimes quite reluctantly. Not infrequently, the finished
product may have errors objectionable to the author; this appears to be
understood by those in the law journal industry, given the number of subse-
quent errata sheets and superseding text issued, 9 as well as author com-
plaints of poor editing.' In Choe, the court dismissed plaintiffs "purported
'moral rights' claim" on the ground that the applicable law "does not recog-
nize an author's common law 'moral rights' to sue for alleged distortion of his
written work."'" Although the dignity-based moral rights approach would
recognize such a claim, it would have difficulty prevailing under the proposed
standard.
A difficult case for resolution under the dignity-based approach involves
the colorization of motion pictures. Beginning from the late 1980s, advances
in cinematic technology made possible the alteration or enhancement of motion
pictures originally made in black and white such that they could be presented
in color. Though now commonplace, the initial announcements by media
mogul Ted Turner (who owned or controlled the rights to numerous classic
films made in black and white) to go forward with colorization met with fierce
opposition by film directors and actors of the black and white genre? Few
289. A random sample: Errata, 34 HoWARD LJ. 1 (1991) (providing corrections to origi-
nal article; 7 pages); Erratum, 74 WAS. L. REv. (No. 1) vii (1999) (providing revised first
footnote to original article).
290. See supra note 116. Authors who wish complete control over the finished product
(and who have the bargaining power to make such a demand) may secure their position by
contract. In Choe, after publication of the article, the dissatisfied author and the editorial board
entered into an agreement that "he would abide by its decision about what action, if any, it
decided to take." Choe, 920 F. Supp. at 46. The court's decision does not rest on the interpreta-
tion of the contract, however.
291. Choe, 920 F. Supp. at 49.
292. Directors and actors provided quotable quotes and sound bites in protesting colori-
zation. See Richard T. Main, Film Snobs Assemble a Color Guard, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29,
1986, § 1, at 18, available at 1986 WL-WSJ 238933 (noting that Woody Allen described color-
ization as "a criminal mutilation;" Jimmy Stewart, "cultural butchery"); David Patrick Steams,
Congress Looks at Colorization: Film Pros Take Battle to the Hill, USA TODAY, May 13,
1987, at ID, available at 1987 WL 4560116 (reporting that WoodyAllen described colorization
as "sinful;" Amadeus director Milos Forman compared it to repainting the Sistine Chapel; James
Stewart called colorization ofIt's a Wonderful Life "'detrimental to the whole film;' Ginger
Rogers reportedly said, "To see yourself painted up like a birthday cake... is embarrassing and
insulting" and claimed that "she never would have stepped before the camera looking as she
does in the colorized version of 42nd Street."); Herman Wong, Art Director Sees a Rosier Pic-
ture for Colorization, LA- TIMES, Sept. 25, 1987, at 6-1, available at 1987 WL 2269477
(stating that Woody Allen, Billy Wilder, and John Huston saw colonization as "a massive, brutal
distortion of the original director's style and emphases in the black-and-white version").
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made a more impassioned case than the late John Huston, the director of
several black and white classics, 3 who protested the colorization movement
to his dying days. 4 Huston was also prone to theatrical rhetoric. He believed
colorization to be a "vulgarity," "as great an impertinence as for someone to
wash flesh tones on a Da Vinci drawing,"'  and suggested a boycott of the
products advertised on televison airings of colorized movies.2" Huston was
at his most colorful when commenting on the alteration of his own films.
After viewing the colorized version of his film The Maltese Falcon, Huston
responded, "My only comment is any four-letter word you can think ot"'
then added, "It's as though our children have been sold into white slavery,"
and "now the Ted Turner organization has dyed their hair."12" The
colorization of the same film was also "bushwhacking"' and "mindless insip-
idity.''I"o After viewing the first few minutes of the colorized version of his
film The Asphalt Jungle, Huston reportedly said, "I just can not watch any-
more... please I can't watch anymore."3"1
293. Among Huston's films are: ACRoss THE PACIFC (Warner Bros. 1942); BEAT THE
DEVIL (United Artists 1953); FREUD (Universal 1962); HEAVEN KNOWS, MR. ALLISON (20th
Century Fox 1957); IN THIS OUR LFE (Warner Bros. 1942); KEY LARGO (Warner Bros. 1948);
MOBYDICK (Warner Bros. 1956); MOUUN ROuGE (United Artist 1954); TE AFRICAN QuEEN
(United Artists 1951); THEAsPHALT JUNGLE (MGM 1950); THE BARBARIAN AND THE GEISHA
(20th Centuy Fox 1958); THE MALTESE FALCON (Warner Bros. 1941); THE MISFITS (United
Artists 1961); THENIGHT OF THE IGUANA (MGM 1964); THE RED BADGE OF COURAGE (MGM
1951); TBERoOTS oFHEAVEN(20th CenturyFox 1958); THE TREASURE OF THE SIERRAMADRE
(Warner Brothers 1948); WE WERE STRANGERS (Columbia 1949).
294. Huston was in poor health at the height of the debate over colorization. He conducted
press conferences and gave testimony before a House subcommittee breathing from an oxygen
tank because of emphysema. Lou Lumenick, Huston's Impressive Scrapbook, THE RECORD
(Northern New Jersey), Aug. 30,1987, available at 1987 WL 4864125.
295. Main, supra note 292.
296. Charles Krauthammer, Casablanca in Color? I'm Shocked, Shocked! (Colorization
of Classic Films), TIME, Jan. 12, 1987, available at 1987 WL 2364353.
297. Penny Pagano, Rulingon ColorizingaBlow toDirectors, L.A_ TIMES, June20,1987,
available at 1987 WL 2166800 (regarding The Maltese Falcon).
298. Dave Kehr, Colorization TurnsAngry Faces Red, Purple, CHL TRM., Dec. 28,1986,
available at 1986 WL 2735751.
299. Steams, supra note 292, at 1D.
300. Bob ThomasLandmarks Fall and ControversyRages on Coloring OldFilmsAsSO-
CIATED PRESS, Dec. 31, 1986, available at 1986 WL 3087142 (regarding colorization of The
Maltese Falcon).
301. David A. Honicky, Film Labelling As a Cure for Colorization [and Other Alter-
ations]: A Band-Aid for a Hatchet Job, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 409, 409 (1994)
(quoting Huston, quoted in Telephone Interview with Keith LaQua, Executive Director of the
Artists Rights Foundation (Apr. 8,1993).
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Had Huston brought an action challenging the colorization " under the
dignity-based standard, with such protests of indignation and outrage and
affront to personality plain, it would be difficult to reject such a case for a
violation of authorial dignity. Here, the protestations of the author would not
be a mere unilateral declaration. Film critics and scholars also added their
voices objecting to colorization; they also addressed the substantial alteration
inherent in colorization. °3 This is one setting in which expert testimony
would have facilitated the informed deliberation of the trier of fact. In the
balancing of competing interests in contrast to the plaintiff's dignity interest,
the interest of the colorizing party appears mostly economic."' 4 Although the
latter would likely advance a property interest and argue that a decision in
favor of the author would amount to an unconstitutional taking, as argued by
Professor Kwall, moral rights protections may be granted consistent with the
demands of constitutional takings."05 Moreover, because it was technology
not available at the time of production of the black and white films that
302. Huston was unsuccessful in persuading Congress to enact legislation prohibiting the
colorization of his movies, with Congress declining to pass a bill. After his death, Huston's
estate brought an action in France, alleging moral rights, and prevailed. Judgment of May 28,
1991, Cass. Civ. Ire, 149 RLI.DA. 197 (1991).
303. See Film IntegrityAct of 1987: Hearing on H.R 2400 Before the House Subcomm.
on Courts, CMilLiberfies, and theAdmin. ofJustice ofthe Comm. of the Judiciary, 100th Cong.
83 (1988) (statement of Vincent Canby, Film Critic, The New York Times) ("When black and
white movies are subjected to a tinting process, the art form is mutilated and corrupted and
history is rewritten."); id. at 90 (statement of Monroe E. Price, Dean, Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law of Yeshiva University) ("I favor a policy of mandatory labeling of films to
disclose whether they are works that are different from the originally issued film in significant
ways. Colorization is one such significant alteration.... "); Main, supra note 292. The views
of film critic Roger Ebert could also have been considered:
On Wednesday night [November 9, 1988] Ted Turner will present a olorized ver-
sion of "Casablanca" on cable television. And that will be one of the saddest days
in the history of the movies. It is sad because it demonstrates that there is no movie
that Turner would spare, no classic safe from the vulgarity of his computerized
graffiti gangs.
Gary R Edgerton, "The Germans Wore Gray, You Wore Blue": Frank Capra, Casablanca, and
the Colorization Controversy of the 1980s, . POPULAR FILM & TELEVISION, Jan. 1,2000, at 24,
available at 2000 WL 14128621 (quoting Roger Ebert).
304. The defendant would likely argue that colorization is a form of free speech and that
enforcement of a moral rights claim is an infringement of its First Amendment rights. This
point has some discussion in the commentary. It has been noted that "a colorizer" is also "an
artistic auteur" entitled to "free expression interests," Beyer, supra note 25, at 1071, but also
that the First Amendment "does not represent 'a license to trammel on legally recognized rights
in intellectual property,'" Wagner, supra note 58, at 721 (quoting Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders,
Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1979)). The First Amendment
dimension has yet to be fully developed in American moral rights litigation.
305, Kwall, How Fine Art Fares Post VARA, supra note 25, at 16-29.
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allowed for colorization, alteration was not foreseen or foreseeable by the
industry or the plaintiff. The factors favor the plaintiff author here.
The above illustrations indicate a method for addressing an author's
claim of the right of integrity in a manner that allows for the balancing of the
competing interests of the creator of the work on the one hand and its user on
the other and that provides the flexibility to consider factors pertinent to the
particular setting. Depending on the facts present, the dignity-based approach
would, like the French model, allow the author to prevail on her claim advanc-
ing the right of integrity, albeit on different (that is, American) grounds. In
other situations, the dignity-based approach, like current U.S. law, would
reject the author's claim, but again, under a different rationale. This is toward
an American moral rights in copyright.
IV Conclusion
Moral rights protections under U.S. law remain in a confused and uncer-
tain state. The personal interests of the American author are not adequately
protected in the thicket of limited statutes and multiple common law theories.
Importing the French droit moral for stateside application is not inviting, as
the French rule on the one side and the American copyright culture on the
other are not suitable partners. What is needed is a moral rights plan based on
an American purpose. Toward this end, this Article proposes consideration
of an American moral rights doctrine premised on the dignity of the author.
Though dignity appears elusive in definition, Congress and the state legisla-
tures have, in an increasing number of settings, recognized that respect for
individual and personal dignity is an end that the law may demand. The right
of authorial dignity would demand respect for the creator of art and writings,
her work, and the creative process. With regard to the author's central right
of integrity, the dignity-based approach would provide for notice to the author
of alteration or use of her work, opportunity for the author to protest such
action, and the legal capacity to challenge it. Resolution would entail a bal-
ancing of the dignity interest of the author and competing interest of the user.
In the end, what may emerge is a doctrine ofmoral rights molded by American
values, one that demands respect for the author's personality interests and the
balancing of competing interests.
